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ARTICLE
"BUT I'M AN ADULT NOW... SORT OF"
ADOLESCENT CONSENT IN HEALTH CARE DECISION-
MAKING AND THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN
PAUL ARSHAGOUNI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a fourteen-year-old boy who has gone on a camping trip
with a group of friends. Your parents have thoughtfully provided the adults
supervising the trip with a medical release form authorizing them to consent to any
required emergency medical care. After leaving you with these responsible adults,
they head off on their own backpacking trip in the Sierra Nevada Mountains. To
your surprise, when you arrive at the camp you discover that the camp authorities
will not allow you in without proof of a tetanus vaccine. As far as you can
remember, the last time you got shots it was before you started kindergarten.
Fortunately, the camp is near a clinic that can administer a tetanus shot. You are
relieved that your week of camping will not be lost. But when you arrive at the
clinic, the health provider tells you that she cannot administer a tetanus injection
without proper consent. You are stuck. The medical release your parents signed
was for emergency care. This does not even resemble emergency care. Your
camping trip is ruined. Now you will have to spend the next two weeks until your
parents return with your Aunt Gertrude, who can't tell an X-box from a xylophone.
Should this adolescent be allowed to consent to a vaccination? This may seem a
trivial question. What difficulty could the ability to consent to a simple and risk
free procedure such as a tetanus booster pose? The question often becomes much
more serious when we consider cases such as the fifteen-year-old who wants to
refuse further life-saving care after his second liver transplantation fails.
Adolescents are in a curious in-between stage of life. They are neither
children nor adults. They are capable of much adult-like thought, yet they have not
generally acquired all the tools necessary to live independently. They want to be
treated like adults, except when they don't want to be. This is a seeming paradox,
but it follows what is becoming an increasingly better understood developmental
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stage. Significant scientific study has been performed in the last several years
attempting to explain much of this paradox. The law has yet to fully catch up with
this growth in scientific information. In recent years a number of legal scholars
and medical practitioners have argued to expand the rights of adolescents to
consent to or refuse medical services in a variety of circumstances.
The question of whether adolescents should have the ability to consent to
their own health care is not merely academic. Substantial health consequences
flow from adolescents' lack of consent capacity. The lack of consent capacity
limits adolescents' access to care. Diminished access to health care leads to poorer
health outcome. A significant number of American teenagers often do not seek
health care in situations where they themselves have deemed it necessary. In a
1999 report within The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA),
researchers at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, surveyed over 20,000
American youths in grades seven through twelve and found that 18.7% (or nearly
one in five) of respondents had foregone health care within the preceding year.'
Forgone healthcare was measured by the response to the question "[h]as there been
any time over the past year when you thought you should get medical care, but did
not?"2 In forgoing health care for the treatment of a medical condition, these teens
placed themselves at risk for developing health care complications that could
jeopardize their lives and futures.
After Massachusetts enacted its 1974 law requiring parental notification for
underage abortion,3 many minors went to other states without such prerequisites in
order to prevent their parents from knowing.4 Of the minors who attended family
planning clinics in Massachusetts at the time of the decision, 9% said they would
rather undergo a self-induced or illegal abortion than tell their parents.5
Finding a better formulation for determining when adolescents can and
should be allowed to make independent health care decisions will help mitigate the
deleterious consequences resulting from adolescents' avoiding timely and
necessary medical treatment.
This article seeks to find this better formulation. Section II will discuss the
nature of what it is to be adolescent and how the law has evolved with respect to
attaining the right of consent. Section III will discuss the recent scientific studies
that have been done to better understand the nature of adolescents. Section IV will
consider some of the proposals made by several scholars in recent years, discussing
1. Carol A. Ford et al., Foregone Health Care Among Adolescents, 282 JAMA 2227, 2227, 2230-
31(1999).
2. Id. at 2230.
3. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12P (2003).
4. Virginia G. Cartoof& Lorraine V. Klerman, Parental Consentfor Abortion: Impact of
the Massachusetts Law, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 397, 399 (1986).
5. See H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 397, 439-40 n.26 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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their strengths and shortcomings. Section V will draw from the recent scientific
understanding of adolescent development to craft a more rational and consistent
approach to adolescent consent. The article will conclude with a proposal as to
how the law should regard adolescents and their decisional capacity.
We must recognize, however, that any hoped-for resolution of the adolescent
consent issue within the health care setting will have potential consequences
throughout all legal disciplines. Understanding how adolescents think, approach
and deal with problems, handle crises, and face long-term consequences can, and
should, inform how we assess adolescents' place in regards to the formation of a
contract or the commission of a tort or a crime. While this article focuses
primarily on adolescents within the health care setting, the principles discussed
here have equal applicability in the settings of a contract enforcement action, a tort
action, or within the criminal justice arena.
II. WHAT IS AN ADOLESCENT ANYWAY?
Before we can adequately discuss what decision-making capacity adolescents
should have, we need to try and understand just what constitutes an "adolescent."
The transition from childhood to adulthood has often been a bit of a gray area.
Americans rank the completion of school as the most important indicator of
adulthood. The data from a 2002 General Social Survey (GSS) showed that 72%
of respondents considered completing school the most important indicator of the
transition to adulthood.6 This ranked even higher than being employed full time or
the ability to support a family. 7 The traditional high school and college graduation
are celebrated enthusiastically nationwide and often serve as markers of the
transition from adolescence to adulthood. After school, the rankings of indicators
of adulthood follow with acquiring a full-time job, ability to support a family, and
financial independence. The mean time for the acquisition of these traits and, thus,
the transition from adolescence to adulthood is a little over five years.
8
Comparing the United States to other nations, the move to a college education
from a secondary education occurs at an earlier age with a higher proportion of
youths in college. American youths also leave home at an earlier age and there is
wider gap in the age and occurrences of transitions. In terms of socially maturing,
American adolescents experience this at an earlier age than those of youths in other
nations.
9
6. Tom W. Smith, Coming of Age in Twenty-First Century America: Public Attitudes Towards
the Importance and Timing of Transitions to Adulthood, 29 AGEING INT'L 136, 138 (2004).
7. Id. at 138-40.
8. Id. at 140.
9. Id. at 137.
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The onset of puberty provides the most overt manifestation of the beginning
of adolescence. Although physical maturation appears to be occurring at an earlier
age than in the past, puberty remains a generally accepted demarcation for the start
of adolescence. Secondary sexual characteristics begin to develop at different
times and at different rates in each individual. The average age for menarche, a
girl's first menstrual period, is approximately 12.4 years in the United States.'
0
One large study of over 17,000 girls found that the average age for the first
physical sign of puberty (pubic hair growth and/or breast development) was
between eight and ten years of age." As many as one in six began by age eight.'
2
Of course physical development is not everything. Even with the early
physical development, many adolescents fail to achieve adulthood status because
they choose not to, or are not permitted to, fulfill the requirements that recognize
their adulthood. A study funded by the MacArthur Foundation and led by
sociology researcher Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. states:
Many [young people] have not become fully adult yet-traditionally
defined as finishing school, landing a job with benefits, marrying, and
parenting-because they are not ready, or perhaps not permitted, to do
so. The life events that make up the transition to adulthood are
accompanied by a sense of commitment, purpose and identity.'
3
Marriage and parenthood are no longer seen as the same primary markers of
adulthood as they were only a few decades ago. The earlier onset of physical
development and the rise in teenage pregnancies have diminished the view of
adulthood through biological standards. In fact, in the 2002 GSS survey
concerning factors that determine adulthood, having a child ranked the lowest, at
below 16%. 14 Education, employment, and supporting a family were the top three
factors and rated as extremely important in the survey, with each of these
adulthood transition items reporting over 60% for all respondents. 15 Furstenberg
10. William Cameron Chumlae et al., Age at Menarche and Racial Comparisons in US Girls, IIl
PEDIATRICS 110, 111 (2003).
1 I. Marcia E. Herman-Giddens et al., Secondary Sexual Characteristics and Menses in Young
Girls Seen in Office Practice: A Study from the Pediatric Research in Office Settings Network, 99
PEDIATRICS 505, 505, 508-09 (1997).
12. See id. at 509 fig. 4 (reporting that 48.3% of 1,639.39 African-American girls (791.83) and
14.7% of 15,437 white girls (2,269.25) showed prevalence of pubic hair and/or breast growth by age
eight). We cannot simply look to physical development when determining the onset of adolescence.
Some children begin sexual maturation early in what is medically referred to as precocious puberty
(commonly defined as the onset of secondary sexual characteristics before the age of eight years).
Unfortunately, children with precocious puberty often begin sexual activity at an earlier age, thereby
putting them at risk of health complications-both physical and psychological-at an earlier age.
13. AM. SOCIOLOGICAL ASs'N, Achieving "Adulthood" Is More Elusive for Today's Youth,
Transition to "Adulthood" Occurring at a Later Age, ASA NEWS, Aug. 2, 2004, at I (quoting Frank F.
Furstenberg, Jr.), http://asanet.org/page.ww?name=Adulthood&Section=Press.
14. Smith, supra note 6, at 139-40.
15. 1d. at 139 tbl.IA.
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remarks that these are "concrete steps associated with the ability to support a
family.' 16 These results reveal the contrast in how adulthood was defined by
American society in the 1960s in comparison to today's standards. In all other
areas, young adults may meet the requirements of adulthood, but in terms of
financial independence many are incapable of achieving this prerequisite of full
adulthood. The inability to pay for medical care also complicates the issue of
adolescent consent to health care. For a much larger proportion of today's
adolescents, early adulthood represents a longer transition period where they learn
the skills of employment while remaining economically dependent on their family.
Furstenberg's research team reviewed the U.S. Census data from 1900 and
2000 and found that it does take much longer to make that transition from
adolescence to adulthood.17 Some authors have referred to this transitional period
as early adulthood or emerging adulthood. Based upon traditional benchmarks,
only 31% of males in 2000 reached adulthood by age thirty, while 65% of males at
that same age attained adulthood in 1960.18 For women in 2000, only 25% would
have reached adulthood by age twenty-five, while 70% of women in 1960 would
have acquired adulthood status at that age.' 9 It now takes longer for men and
women to complete an education and find a job that earns enough to support a
family.
20
Jeffrey Jensen Arnett of the University of Maryland, College Park, has
proposed that a period from the late teens through the early twenties be classified
as a fourth category of development, termed "emerging adulthood."' z l This age
group would fall between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. 22 Amett argues
that this stage of development is distinct from adolescence and young adulthood.23
He makes the further observation that emerging adulthood exists only in societies
where there is an extended period of independent role exploration in the late teens
and early twenties.24
Arnett provides an example of someone he feels typifies his views of the
youth as the emergent adult. This individual is a student in her early twenties who
will soon finish college but does not yet see a clear path for her unknown future.
2 5
16. AM. SOCIOLOGICAL ASS'N, supra note 13, at I.
17. Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., Growing Up Is Harder to Do, 3 CONTEXTS: UNDERSTANDING




20. Id. at 4.
21. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development From the Late Teens
Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 469 (2000).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 469-70.
25. Id. at 469.
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26She knows that at the same age her mother already had a ring on her finger. We
can analogize Arnett's emergent adulthood stage as similar to the chrysalis stage of
the butterfly. It is at these stages that adolescent youths are transforming
themselves into the final form that they will take in adulthood. The male and
female roles that exist for adolescents today are not as fixed and certain as they
were for their parents or grandparents a mere few decades ago. The expectation of
growing up, getting married, and having kids with a house in the suburbs is no
longer the mindset of the majority. From the survey numbers already seen, having
a child ranks the lowest as the most important indicator of attaining adulthood
whereas a few decades ago it ranked as the highest.
27
Arnett also cites these changing roles. He notes that the U.S. Census
statistics indicating the median age of marriage in 1970 was twenty-three for men
and twenty-one for women, whereas in 1996, the median age of marriage had risen
to twenty-seven for men and twenty-five for women.28 Along with delay of
marriage, many more young Americans seek a higher education. The percentage
of individuals seeking a post-secondary education has grown from 14% in 1940 to
over 60% in the mid-1990s. 29 The delay in marriage and parenthood, along with
extending education, has altered the timing for transition into long-term adult roles.
The late teens and early twenties are now marked with numerous changes and
explorations that will determine adolescents' future life course.
30
The United States is not the only country where the age of marriage has
shifted upwards. A median age of marriage for women in 1996 at twenty-six to
twenty-seven years of age is typical of industrialized nations such as Germany,
Japan, and Australia. 3 1 In developing countries the median age for marriage in
women is lower, ranging from nineteen to twenty-two in countries like Nigeria,
India, and Brazil. 32  Arnett emphasizes that emerging adulthood is not a
phenomenon that typifies countries, but instead typifies cultures. Even in the
United States where the median age of marriage has risen, in Mormon culture,
where emerging adulthood is diminished or nonexistent and youths are expected to
marry early and have large families, the median age of marriage still remains
low.33 Emerging adulthood occurs only in cultures that delay the onset of adult
roles and duties. This is seen most frequently in industrialized nations.34
26. Id.
27. Smith, supra note 6, at 139-40.
28. Arnett, supra note 21, at 469.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 478 tbl. 1.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 478.
34. Id.
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The emerging adulthood stage is marked by immense change and importance
where the education and training that a person receives will form the basis of their
adult life. These frequent changes occur in relationships, employment, and world
opinions. Amett, like other authors and studies, points out how the life-changing
decisions that occur at this time in life often have long-lasting implications for the
future course of that youth's life.35 In a study of life span analysis by Peter Martin
and Michael Smyer, adults most often point to the events of this stage as one of the
most important in their lives.36 Because this stage of life is so crucial in the
development towards adulthood, the health care decisions made at this time must
also be taken with considerable care. Conversely, policies that inhibit access to
health care or delay decisions regarding health care treatment can equally
jeopardize the future of these youths, and so need to be addressed.
The proposition that Arnett makes for the theory of emerging adulthood
marks this stage as a distinct entity, wholly separate from adolescence or young
adulthood.37  It is a period that is independent from social roles and typical
expectations. The transformative stage of emergent adulthood is free from both the
dependency of adolescence and the anchors that mark adulthood. The degree of
freedom and exploration possible at this stage of life is often greater than in any
other. 38 As Amett states, "For most people, the late teens through the mid-twenties
are the most volitional years of life.
39
Arnett points to Erik Erikson's work from the 1950s, which commented on
the "prolonged adolescence" that typified industrial societies and the "psychosocial
moratorium" given to youths to experiment in order to find their role and place in
society. 40 The basis for risk prone behaviors can be partially explained through
science in brain development studies showing that adolescent brains do not
physically mature in cognitive areas that can assess long-term consequences of
such behavior until youths reach their early twenties.4' It is because of such risk
behaviors that many adolescents need access to confidential health care, which will
help treat these health events at earlier stages before they develop into major life-
threatening and life-altering complications in the future. There must be avenues
35. Id. at 469.
36. See Peter Martin & Michael A. Smyer, The Experience of Micro- and Macroevents: A Life
Span Analysis, 12 RES. ON AGING 294, 305 (1990) (reporting that, when rating life events in order of
importance, older adults indicated that their young adult years represented "an especially dense period
of life-event reminiscence").
37. Amett, supra note 21, at 469, 476-77.
38. Id. at 469.
39. Id.
40. ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 156 (1968).
41. See Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, Teenage brain: A Work in Progress (2001),
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/teenbrain.cfm (reporting differences in brain composition between
young adults and teens show that adults have increased capabilities for cognitive processing).
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that address the need for open medical care for our youths as they enter into this
stage of transition.
A. The Adolescent Dilemma
We are still left with the question of what is an adolescent? We have the
simple answer. It is the developmental transition from childhood to adulthood.
While functionally true, this is unhelpful. We need to know what demarcates the
outer borders of the transition. The onset of adolescence seems more certain.
Once puberty hits, the transition has begun. The dilemma we face here is
determining when it ends and what adolescents should be allowed to do during the
transition.
Adults often understand the potential long-term consequences resulting from
the lack of necessary medical treatment based on their own knowledge and
experience. However, teenagers generally do not possess such knowledge and may
lack the ability to make long-term projections about their health. As such,
adequate foresight may not be as prevalent. In fact, the single biggest reason that
adolescents give for avoiding necessary health care treatment was the belief that
the problem would go away. According to Carol Ford, an overwhelming 63.3%
stated this as their primary reason for avoiding treatment. 42  This belief well
eclipsed the next closest reason, fear of what the physician would say or do, by
almost 50%.
4 3
Several factors contributed to the likelihood of adolescents' deciding to
forego health care. The overall average rate of self-reported forgone health care
was 18.7%. 44 Interestingly, of the adolescents surveyed, those who practiced risky
behaviors (such as smoking, drinking, and sexual activity) had forgone health care
services at a rate higher than the average. 45  Adolescents who were frequent
smokers made up 21.6% of all respondents and had a 26% rate of forgoing health
care. 46 Frequent alcohol users constituting 5.7% of respondents had forgone health
care rates of over 30%. 47 Adolescent who were sexually active made up 38.3% of
respondents and had medical care avoidance rates of 25.1%.48 Statistically
speaking, those who displayed two or more of these health risk behaviors were
more prone to health complications, and were even more likely to forego health
care.
42. Ford et al., supra note I, at 2232.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2230.
45. Id. at 2230 tbl.2, 2231.
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The study also measured the rates of forgone health care in youths who had
symptoms of physical or mental health problems. Adolescents who reported that
they had frequent physical symptoms constituted 12.7% of respondents and had
rates of 32.4% in forgone health care. 49  Frequent criers made up 1.8% of
adolescent respondents and had health care avoidance rates of 38.5%.50
Adolescents with symptoms of dysuria (painful or frequent urination) occurred in
1.4% of respondents and had health care avoidance rates of 38.2%. 5 1 Notably, the
burning sensation upon urination may be caused by a sexually transmitted disease
or bacterial urinary tract infection that affects the bladder. Both causes can lead to
greater health complications with delayed treatment.
52
The concerning results of this research data indicate that adolescents with
high health risk activities and/or health care problems and who have an even
greater need for medical treatment show the highest rates of forgone health care.
Of those who reported that they did not seek needed health care, 11.5% said
that the reason they did not seek care was that they did not want their parents to
know. 53 Another 11.7% indicated that there was no adult available to take them to
a health care provider. 54  Fifteen-and-a-half percent were afraid of what the
physician would say or do.55
The concern of teenagers regarding privacy and not wanting their parents to
know brings up significant questions about the need for adolescent consent and
privacy in medical treatment. Adults expect privacy in medical treatment as a
universal right. Adolescents, who must obtain parental consent before even the
most innocuous health care visit, are not afforded this same right. We could ask
what health care services competent adults might forego if their employers,
spouses, or family members were notified of their medical procedures and
consultations. When should adolescents, navigating the path to full autonomy, also
have the same rights of confidentiality?
Adolescents' fear regarding what the physician might say or do may result
from misconceptions regarding medical treatment generally or misconceptions
regarding the specific conditions for which they would seek care. This suggests an
inability to project to future circumstances, which may be a sound reason for




52. See MedicineNet.com, Burning Urination Symptoms & Signs Index, http://medicinenet.com/
scriptlmain/forum.asp?articlekey=24704 (last visited Sept. 21, 2006); MedicineNet.com, Sexually
Transmitted Diseases (STDs in Men), http://www.medicinenet.com/sexually_transmitted-diseases-stds
in men/pagel3.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
53. Ford et al., supra note 1, at 2232 tbl.4.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2232.
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perspective, we may see this as an argument in favor of expanding adolescent
consent. When adolescents believe they can seek medical advice without the fear
of their parents' knowledge, they may actually seek advice and treatment for their
condition. As with most diseases, early detection and prevention help to prevent
major complications in the future. This is a health care policy that has been
strongly advocated for years. 56 If we wish to foster such responsible behavior in
our youth, in order that they may continue toward sound health practices, then we
need to nurture such attitudes at an early age.
Another 2002 study published in JAMA reported a survey of Planned
Parenthood clinics throughout Wisconsin, which polled 950 females under the age
of eighteen.57 It found that 59% (nearly six in ten) of respondents would stop
using health care services, including delaying testing or treatment for HIV or
STDs, if parental consent were required. 58 Astonishingly, 99% of these
respondents said that they would continue to have sex. 59 Opponents of adolescent
consent for medical treatment without requiring parental notification or consent
argue that such consent will lead to increased risky behavior.60 The results of this
survey would indicate that adolescent activities in risky behavior would more than
likely continue with or without parental knowledge or permission. In fact, parental
consent or notification would actually factor negatively in youth behavior that
would promote health precautions in prevention of disease or unwanted
pregnancies.
The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance
System (YRBSS) measures six areas of high health-risk behaviors among
American youths and young adults. 61 These include tobacco use, alcohol and drug
use, physical inactivity (obesity), and risky sexual behavior. The national survey
measured responses from youths in 9th through 12th grade from October 2004
through January of 2006.62 The results showed that within thirty days preceding
56. See, e.g., Frances A. Althaus, An Ounce of Prevention . . . STDs and Women's Health, 23
FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 173 (1991) (arguing for increased prevention, screening, and
treatment to prevent the consequences of untreated STDs); COMM. ON ADOLESCENCE, AM. ACAD. OF
PEDIATRICS, Counseling the Adolescent About Pregnancy Options, 83 PEDIATRICS 135 (1989)
(extolling the benefits of early pregnancy identification in teenagers); see also COMM. ON
ADOLESCENCE, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, The Adolescent's Right to Confidential Care When
Considering Abortion, 97 PEDIATRICS 749 (1996) (recognizing the danger in delaying medical advice
and care for teenage pregnancy).
57. Diane M. Reddy et al., Effect of Mandatory Parental Notification on Adolescent Girls' Use of
Sexual Health Care Services, 288 JAMA 710, 711 (2002).
58. Id. at 713.
59. Id.
60. See Angela Diaz et al., Legal and Ethical Issues Facing Adolescent Health Care Professionals,
71 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 181, 182 (2004).
61. Danice K. Eaton, Ph.D. et. al, Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance - United States, 2005, 55
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1 (2006).
62. Id.
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the survey, 28.5% had ridden in a car with someone who had been drinking,
63
while 43.3% (or approximately 7.25 million) said they had drunk alcohol. 64 About
half these numbers, 20.2% (or 3.4 million) had used marijuana.65 Only 2.1% of the
adolescent respondents reported that they had ever injected an illegal drug.66
These statistics, as well as many others drawn from the YRBSS, demonstrate that
adolescents engage in risky behavior with a frequency that would trouble any
parent.
The 2005 YRBSS results also revealed that 46.8% or roughly 7.8 million
high school students have had sexual intercourse. 67 Of those who were sexually
active, only 62.8% reported using a condom in their last sexual encounter. 68 The
low rate of condom use is surprising considering that no state laws require parental
notification in order for a minor to purchase nonprescription contraceptives. State
laws do not generally prohibit physicians from writing prescriptive contraception
for a minor.69 A few states also give an age, usually sixteen, at which a minor can
request contraceptives, but do not punish the doctor for treating patients who are
even younger than this specified age.70 However, many states permit a physician
to breach confidentiality and inform the parent when writing a contraceptive
prescription for a minor.71 Such breaches of a youth's privacy would undoubtedly
deter an adolescent from seeking a contraceptive prescription from a physician.
This interaction of rules brings into conflict issues of the minor patient's concerns
for privacy against the adolescent's actual cognitive and decisional capacity, as
well as the parents' right to know about their child's behavior.
Multiple factors may result in the low incidence of adolescent condom use,
including careless neglect and willful reckless behavior. Additional factors include
access to such contraception and the negative stigma minors may feel when
purchasing contraceptives. Changing public views and judgments of an
adolescent's purchase of contraceptives may prove difficult, but access is
something that can be modified. Some pharmacies and stores place condoms and
contraceptives in locked drawers that require notification and access from a store
employee. The statistics we have seen indicate the high rate of sexual activity
among adolescents. Adolescents will continue their sexual activity irrespective of
the requirements of parental consent and notification before they are allowed
63. Id. at 5, 38 tbl.4.
64. Id. at 13, 62 tbl.28.
65. Id. at 14, 64 tbl.30.
66. Id. at 15, 66 tbl.32.
67. Id. at 19, 78 tbl.44.
68. Id. at 21, 80 tb.46.
69. EDWARD P. RICHARDS & KATHARINE C. RATHBUN, LAW AND THE PHYSICIAN: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE 377 (1993).
70. Diaz et al., supra note 55, at 182.
71. Id.
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access to contraceptives. While a primary goal is to discourage teenage sexual
activity, the realities of their behavior necessitate the need for them to have
confidential access to contraceptives that can prevent unwanted pregnancies and
STDs.
While state laws do not require parental notification when a minor purchases
nonprescription contraceptives, certain state laws do place restrictions in the free
distribution of contraceptives to minors. In one case, New York Public Health
Law section 2504 allows minors to consent to "medical, dental, health and hospital
services," without specifying those services.72 New York City high schools
instituted a condom availability program to stem the rise of HIV/AIDS among the
student population.73 The distribution program was part of the New York City
Board of Education's mandated HIV/AIDS education curriculum. 74 Parents of the
students brought a suit in which the appeals court determined that condom
availability fell under a "health service" as used by section 2504(1), which required
parental consent for adolescents to participate in the program. 75 The requirement
for parental consent defeats the purpose of such a distribution program in helping
adolescents gain access to contraceptives that would help to prevent HIV/AIDS
and STDs.
To emphasize the need for private and accessible contraceptives for
adolescents we need only look back to the statistics. In spite of declining teen
pregnancy rates over the years, approximately one in thirteen teenage girls are
pregnant at least once before their twentieth birthday.76 During 1994, within the
U.S., 78% or approximately 630,000 teen pregnancies were unintended.77
Approximately four million sexually active teenagers contract an STD each year,
accounting for one fourth of all newly diagnosed STDs.78
For adults older than twenty-five years of age, two factors, cardiovascular
disease and cancer, account for 62.9% of all deaths.79 The 2005 YRBS indicated
72. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(3)-(4) (McKinney 2002) (allowing any pregnant person to
consent to services related to hospital care, and waiving certain parental consent requirements in
emergencies).
73. Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 261 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
74. Id.; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 135.3(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 2005).
75. Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 264; Nancy Batterman, Under Age: A Minor's Right to Consent to
Health Care, 10 TOURO L. REV. 637, 674 (1994).
76. STANLEY K. HENSHAW, ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., U.S. TEENAGE PREGNANCY STATISTICS
WITH COMPARATIVE STATISTICS FOR WOMEN AGED 20-24, at 5 (2004), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/teenstats.pdf.
77. Stanley K. Henshaw, Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, 30 FAMILY PLANNING
PERSPECTIVES 24, 26 tbl.1 (1998).
78. CYNTHIA DAILARD, ALAN GUTVMACHER INST., FAMILY PLANNING CLINICS AND STD
SERVICES 8 (2002), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/05/3/grO50308.pdf.
79. ROBERT N. ANDERSON & BEI-rY L. SMITH, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS, DEATHS: LEADING CAUSES FOR 2002, at 7 (2005), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr53/nvsr53_1 7.pdf.
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that the risk behaviors linked with these two causes of death were initiated during
adolescence. Within thirty days of the survey, 23% (or 3.8 million) high school
students had smoked cigarettes. 80 The YRBS also asked about diet and exercise.
Nearly four fifths (79.9%) of adolescents reported that they had fewer than five
servings per day of fruits and vegetables in the preceding seven days.8 Nearly two
thirds (64.2%) reported failing to meet currently recommended levels of physical
activity.82 Not surprisingly, the survey found that 13.1% of adolescents were
overweight, with another 15.7% at risk for becoming overweight. 83 Such poor
health care decisions early in life lead to lifelong patterns of poor health behaviors
and undoubtedly contribute to the high rate of heart diseases and cancer in adult
causes of death.
The statistical data on youth risk behavior paints a very grim picture of
adolescents' behavior. These results suggest that the reckless and careless
behavior of adolescents would predispose them against making sound medical
decisions regarding their own health care. This argues strongly against permitting
adolescents to provide consent for their own treatment. Proponents of unrestricted
adolescent consent capacity argue that the stigma associated with the indiscretions
of youth behavior often prevents them from seeking medical treatment even when
they may fully understand the consequences of their behavior.84  The social
stereotypes and restrictions that we wish to impose upon our youths often create an
atmosphere of secrecy. Risky behavior among adolescents can occur through
careless neglect or disregard for the consequences of such behavior.
However, that same attitude of disregard need not cloud the judgment or
impair that adolescent's ability to seek medical care and advice. Realizing that a
mistake has occurred and accepting the consequences of one's behavior is the first
step. The second step in seeking treatment for the ill effects resulting from such
behavior should never be denied to an individual, especially in cases involving
adolescents. Making mistakes is a part of adolescent behavior and is an essential
part of the growing up process. Making amends and mitigating the ill effects of
one's misjudgment are traits that we want to instill in our children. In a society
that cherishes independence and freedom, when we grant children autonomy and
consent over their own medical treatment, we help to foster these traits.
80. Eaton, supra note 61, at 11, 56 tbl.22.
81. Id. at22, 84 tbl.50.
82. Id. at 23, 86 tbl.52.
83. Id. at 26, 94 tbl.60.
84. See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence:
Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 758 (2000) (discussing
the unavoidable skew in self-reporting studies toward a reporting of more socially acceptable
responses).
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
Fears of poor medical decisions on the part of adolescents are largely
misdirected. We must consider the statistics cited above, which indicate a high
rate of poor choices, with the proper perspective. The choices they represent
correspond to independent decisions made by adolescents within their own peer
group. They may reflect the adolescent's decision whether to seek health care
services or not. However, once that first decision has been made, the adolescent's
subsequent decisions are made with the guidance of a health care professional. A
doctor or nurse possesses the knowledge and expertise to advise an adolescent
regarding a given medical decision. As is true for most adults, when we visit a
doctor, we depend on him or her to give us sound advice. Adolescents may well
be better off seeking medical treatment on their own than doing without care and
risking potentially serious health complications arising from a lack of timely
medical care.
Adults have the option to treat and rectify the consequences of risky
behaviors in which they may have been willing participants. Such options are not
as easily available to adolescents who engage in such risky behaviors. Research
has shown that the same media campaigns to encourage responsible behavior and
medical treatment among adults do not often work as effectively for adolescents.8 5
We need a more uniform and effective health care policy toward adolescent
consent to medical treatment.
The health risk behaviors of adolescents, which create adverse effects in later
life, demonstrate the need to provide medical information and access to health care
for them. The numerous studies that we have seen all indicate that teens are less
likely to seek health care if they are required to obtain parental consent before they
are allowed access to medical treatment or care.86
85. See, e.g., Cornelia Pechmann et al., What to Convey in Antismoking Advertisements for
Adolescents: The Use of Protection Motivation Theory to Identify Effective Message Themes, 67 J.
MKTG. 1, 11-14 (2003) (reporting that the most effective anti-smoking advertising conveyed risks of
social disapproval); see also Paula G. Williams et al., Adolescent Health Psychology, 70 J. CONSULTING
& CLINICAL PSYCItOL. 828 (2002).
86. The general rule, of course, is that parents make all health care decisions for their minor
children. The presumption of parental rights, while strong, is not inviolable. The presumption also
rests in large part on the notion that parents are in the best position to act in the minor's best interests.
This is generally true. However, in some circumstances parents act in accordance with their own
perceptions. For example, American parents commonly circumcise male newborns. There is little
evidence to support this practice from a medical perspective. The American Academy of Pediatrics
(AAP) does not currently recommend routine circumcision. See TASK FORCE ON CIRCUMCISION, AM.
ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, Circumcision Policy Statement 103 PEDIATRICS 686, 691 (1999), available at
http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/pediatrics;103/3/686.pdf (finding that potential medical
benefits of newborn male circumcision may exist, but that these data are not sufficient to recommend
routine neonatal circumcision). The practice nonetheless remains common, largely for religious and
cultural reasons. We accept that parents can and should make such decisions for their infant sons.
A similar argument could be made for female circumcision as it is practiced in some cultures,
although, unlike male circumcision, there isn't even a weak medical justification. The AAP has come
out strongly opposed to any female circumcision. See COMM. ON BIOETHICS, AM. ACAD. OF
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The adolescent dilemma has at least two sides. The right of an adolescent to
give consent to health care services has an equally important counterpart. What
right does an adolescent have to refuse consent for health care services?
Numerous cases have hit the courts wherein a minor refuses potentially beneficial
medical treatment, sometimes with and sometimes without his or her parents'
agreement. Such cases test the physician's and state's duty to the protection and
health of a minor. They also test the application of the mature minor doctrine.
Take, for example, the case of Angelica Niebla. Angelica and her parents
were Jehovah's Witnesses whose religion dictates that they "abstain from blood."
They interpreted this to mean that they must refuse all blood transfusions, even in
life threatening situations. Angelica had been admitted to the University of
California, San Diego Medical Center with a declining blood count. Her parents
refused to permit a transfusion, citing religious objection. Angelica, then fifteen
years old, agreed with this view and refused transfusion. The county obtained
emergency exparte orders giving the county custody of Angelica and authorizing a
blood transfusion.88 Angelica sought the right to make her own medical decisions
under the mature minor doctrine. The court declined to make such a finding.
89
More peculiar are circumstances that seem almost paradoxical in nature.
Most state laws require parental permission for a minor to obtain an aspirin at
school. However, in some states, such as California, it is perfectly legal for that
PEDIATRICS, Female Genital Mutilation, 102 PEDIATRICS 153, 155-156 (1998), available at
http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/pediatrics;102/l/153.pdf (warning that performance of
female genital mutilation violates principles of nonmaleficence as well as standards of basic human
rights). The issue of female circumcision pits the desire of the parents against the duties of the doctors
to the care of their patients.
The issue becomes even more controversial when we come to the topic of ambiguous genitalia.
Ambiguous genitalia has multiple causes, including congenital adrenal hyperplasia,
pseudohermaphroditism, and various chromosomal abnormalities. When a baby is born with
ambiguous genitalia it may become difficult to classify the newborn as male or female. The condition
is usually not life threatening; however, the question of gender assignment can prove difficult. In
earlier times, it was almost always common practice to reassign the baby as a female with the
appropriate surgery for that gender reassignment. Currently the decision process is more complex and
often involves special teams of specialists, including neonatologists, geneticists, endocrinologists, and
psychiatrists or social workers. See Medline Plus Medical Encyclopedia, Ambiguous genitalia,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/O03269.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). Scholars
have argued that when possible, such surgeries be delayed until the child is mature enough to participate
in the decision-making process. See Laura Hermer, Paradigms Revised Intersex Children, Bioethics &
the Law, II ANNALS HEALTH L. 195, 198, 213 (2002).
These situations highlight the argument that parental consent and decision-making, while the
proper default mechanism, may not always be in the best interest of a child even if done with the best of
intentions.
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minor to give his own consent for tongue piercing.90 Parental consent is not
currently required, though a bill pending in the California legislature would require
parental presence or notarized consent for a body piercing.91 Other states, such as
Michigan, require written parental consent for any piercing other than the ear.
92
Almost every state, including California, requires parental consent for tattooing of
a minor.
93
B. Old Enough to Walk, But Not Old Enough to Run
Recent research involving MRI scans has indicated that adolescent brain
development may not be fully developed until youth reach their early twenties.
94
Higher levels of cognitive development involving reasoning, risk-taking, and
impulse control are not fully matured in adolescents as revealed through these
studies. This evidence would serve as a scientific basis to deny adolescents
autonomy in medical decision-making, but a look at social history and law would
contradict this position.
Additional dilemmas exist when health care professionals diagnose
conditions that may not correspond to the one first contemplated by the minor or
the minor's parents. How do we resolve the situation where a sixteen-year-old
comes to the emergency room with her mother for the diagnosis and treatment of a
throat complaint? Both adolescent and parent initially believe it is a bacterial
throat infection such as strep throat. The ER staff instead diagnoses oral
gonorrhea. Should the ER staff inform the parent regarding the diagnosis?
Equally problematic is a situation with the reverse diagnostic result. Most states
give adolescents the statutory power to consent to the diagnosis and treatment of
sexually transmitted disease.95 What should happen when an adolescent arrives at
a clinic for treatment of a presumed oral gonorrhea infection? In these states, a
fourteen-year-old has the independent capacity to give consent for the diagnosis
90. Jim Sanders, Bill Would Require Parents to OK Child's Body Piercing, SACRAMENTO BEE,
May 12, 2005, at A3, available at http://www.sacbee.com/content/politics/ca/story/12877469p-
13726502c.html.
91. CAL. PENAL CODE § 652(a) (West Supp. 2006).
92. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.13102 (West 2001) (prohibiting "tattooing, branding, or
body-piercing of minors" without written informed consent of parent or legal guardian).
93. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006).
94. E.g., Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A
Longitudinal MR1 Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCI. 861, 861-862 (1999); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In
Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE
NEUROSCI. 859, 861 (1999).
95, E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-1 IA-19 (LexisNexis 1997); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-132.01 (2003);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 6926 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 710 (1999); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 210/4 (West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5127 (West 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3709.241 (LexisNexis 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23-16 (1994); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-10
(LexisNexis 2001).
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and treatment of a venereal disease. The physician diagnoses instead a common
strep throat. Must the physician stop all activity and turn the minor away, thereby
delaying necessary treatment? Some states resolve this dilemma by granting the
adolescent the power to consent upon professing affliction with a transmitted
disease.96
Consider also a recent Florida case. In West Palm Beach, a thirteen-year-old
teenage girl became pregnant while living in a state-run group home.97 She was on
her way with her caseworker to a clinic to undergo an abortion when officials from
the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF) objected to the abortion
and filed for an emergency hearing on April 26, 2005. DCF alleged that Florida
law prevented the agency from consenting to the procedure. The girl, known only
as L.G. because she was a minor, had been in foster care since she was nine years
old. Her mother had parental rights terminated due to abuse and neglect. DCF
became her legal guardian following the termination of her parents' rights. DCF
sought prevention of the abortion on the basis that L.G. was not mature enough for
such a decision. After a competency hearing, L.G. was determined to be
competent and understood the consequences of her decision. The original judge
who had ordered that the abortion be halted now granted her the right to an
abortion.98
C. Adolescent Limbo: Where Do Adolescents Stand Under the 'Bar' of the Law?
The general age of majority in the United States has shifted downwards from
twenty-one to eighteen. The most significant aspect of this manifested with the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment, lowering the voting age in 1971.99 Significant markers
of full adulthood remain set at twenty-one (e.g., consuming alcohol), but in most
96. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 577A-2 (LexisNexis 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-18
(1998).
97. Kathleen Chapman, Diocese Employee: Deny Judge Communion, PALM BEACH POST, May 6,
2005, at IA.
98. Id.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. The country wanted to redress the inconsistency of requiring
eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-olds to fight the country's wars, while not permitting them
participation in the political process that led to declaring and waging those wars. Two options existed.
First, the country could either have raised the age at which young men were drafted or permitted to
volunteer for the military. Alternatively, the country could have lowered the voting age to eighteen. It
is interesting that we chose the latter option. One wonders what effect raising the age one could join the
military to twenty-one would have had on recruiting in an all-volunteer military. Given the change in
risk assessment and valuation of long-term consequences that occurs over those years, it is likely that
far fewer individuals would opt to join the military. Currently, the significant majority of military
recruits are under age twenty-one. In 2003, 70.35% of applicants were aged sixteen to twenty (23%
under age eighteen). See DEP'T OF DEF., POPULATION REPRESENTATION IN THE MILITARY SERVICES:
FISCAL YEAR 2003, tbl. A-I, available at http://www.dod.mil/prhome/poprep2003/download/
AppendixA.pdf.
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legal contexts, the age of majority is now eighteen years. This is certainly true
with respect to matters of health care consent.
1. The Rule of Sevens
Courts have recognized the varying levels of minor maturity and capacity for
well over a century. The 1845 English case of The Queen v. Smith laid out the
common law rule known as the Rule of Sevens.'00 Under this rule, minors under
seven years of age carry an irrebutable presumption of no capacity (incapable of
harmful intent). Minors between the ages of seven and fourteen have a rebuttable
presumption of no capacity. Minors from the ages of fourteen to twenty-one have
a rebuttable presumption of capacity. Those over twenty-one are presumed to have
full capacity.' 0'
While the common law has evolved considerably since 1845, the Rule of
Sevens retains some of its vitality. As recently as 1996, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals cited approvingly to The Queen v. Smith and the Rule of Sevens in the
case of Roddy v. Volunteer Medical Clinic.10 2 In Roddy, a mother and her sixteen-
year-old daughter brought a malpractice suit against the doctor who performed an
abortion procedure and the clinic where the medical procedure occurred. 0 3 The
court found, on summary judgment, for the defendants because the plaintiffs failed
to show that the daughter, who was sixteen at the time of the procedure and had
sought the abortion without the knowledge or consent of her mother, lacked
capacity to consent to the medical procedure. 0 4 The suit contended that the
physician and clinic violated the Tennessee Parental Consent for Abortions by
Minors Act.' °5 The Tennessee Court of Appeals cited to the landmark case of
Cardwell v. Bechtol,0 6 which, relying upon The Queen v. Smith, held that mature
minors have the capacity to consent in medical cases.'0 7 The Roddy court directly
cited Cardwell in holding that "recognition that minors achieve varying degrees of
maturity and responsibility (capacity) has been part of the common law for well
over a century," ' 8 referring to The Queen v. Smith. The court then applied
principles of the Rule of Sevens, explaining that "at the time Miss Roddy signed
100. The Queen v. Smith, (1845) 1 Cox C.C. 260 (Crim.).
101. Id.
102. Roddy v. Volunteer Med. Clinic, 926 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Cardwell
v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn.1987)).
103. Id. at 572.
104. Id at 578.
105. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-301 (2005). This act was later found to be unconstitutional as it
placed an undue burden upon a minor's ability to seek an abortion. However, this ruling was reversed
by the Sixth Circuit. See Memphis Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist, 175 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 1999).
106. 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987).
107. Roddy, 926 S.W.2d at 576 (citing Cardwell 724 S.W.2d at 744).
108. Id.
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the consent to abortion document, she was just one month from her 16th birthday
and Appellants failed to rebut the presumption of capacity."'
0 9
The Roddy case illustrates how rules such as the Rule of Sevens, while
seemingly arbitrary, can serve as a guideline for courts when deciding the
boundaries of relative minor capacity. However, these rules ought not act as
absolute, bright-line demarcations.l"0 Adolescent maturity development proceeds
109. Id.
110. Bright line rules have a highly useful function. They give courts a clear way to determine how
to decide a particular case. If the person is seventeen years and 364 days old, he does not have capacity.
If he is eighteen years and one day old, he does have capacity. Bright line rules give courts simple, easy
means to determine results. The ease for the court, however, is not the strongest argument for their use.
Courts, with time to assess the relative merits of a situation, may be required to move beyond a simple
bright line rule. Arguably, one of the roles of the court should be to determine in which circumstances a
bright line rule should be discarded. Otherwise, an administrator could easily replace the court.
The more important function of a bright line rule is to guide parties. Such rules tell parties how
they can and cannot behave. It relieves the provider of risk in making a wrong judgment as to the
maturity of a given adolescent. Predictability and consistency are the greatest value for bright line
rules.
Bright line rules have several real problems, however. A bright line rule is intended to draw a
clear line between those who fall above and below the line. This works well when there is a real
distinction between those groups. The power of a bright line rule begins to falter when the individuals
who fall just above the line are indistinguishable from those who fall just below the line. The error is
small or large depending on the width of the gray zone.
Wherever one draws a bright line, there will inevitably be a certain number of individuals who in
truth should have fallen on the other side of the line. Epidemiologically, these are known as false
positives and false negatives. The greater the number of false positives and false negatives, the less
usefulness we have for a given bright line rule. Generally speaking, the more we try to limit false
negatives, the more we will increase the false positives. This can be a very good thing. As a society,
we are willing to accept a relatively high number of false positives in certain circumstances, such as the
initial screening of passengers boarding an airplane. A large number of passengers who are not
carrying dangerous metal objects are asked to undergo further screening if any metal appears when
passing through. We allow this so as to minimize the false negatives (the few individuals who were
carrying knives intent on hijacking the airplane).
Lines must often be drawn somewhere. Ideally, we will draw the line so as to have the highest
possible predictive value. This is a particularly hard thing to do with respect to adolescent decision-
making capacity. The range of time over which children develop into adults is very wide, spanning
over a decade. While we can say with some assurance that adolescents at the ends of the range mostly
fall on the correct side of the bright line, the closer we get to the line, the less confidence we have. This
is complicated even further in that all aspects of development do not occur at the same time. As
discussed through this article, certain aspects of cognitive thought occur early, while others occur later.
Each of these has its own range of occurrence. A single bright-line rule of maturity applied to all
aspects serves only to magnify the errors.
The proposal I discuss below essentially splits the bright line rule. We have done this already with
respect to specific services for specific conditions. We have a general bright line rule at age eighteen.
We have another bright-line rule for treatment of sexually transmitted diseases (age fourteen is some
states, twelve in California). What I propose is a different division of the bright line rule to better
reflect adolescents' actual capabilities. Two bright line rules: one for high risk procedures (kept at age
eighteen-though the science tells us it should be closer to twenty-two), one for low risk procedures
(lowered to age fourteen or fifteen). This would minimize the error rate with respect to whether the
adolescent had the capacity to make a decision of the sort that is in question.
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at highly varied rates from individual to individual. Strict demarcations based
solely upon chronological age, while highly precise in their results, generate far too
many false positives and false negatives. This, of course, begs the question of how
courts may determine capacity if it is not based strictly upon age. First, let us
examine how the law has sought to affix capacity based upon the living conditions
or circumstances of the minor.
2. The Emancipated Minor
There remain two significant exceptions to the general rule that minors may
not legally make medical decisions until they reach the age of majority-in
emergencies and for emancipated minors. Most states permit adolescents to
consent to needed emergency care without the knowledge of the parent or guardian
if there is insufficient time to notify the legal guardians."' 1 This exception,
however, does little to aid our understanding of when adolescents should or should
not be given broader consent capacity. The emergency exception analysis rests
primarily on the nature of the service being rendered and not on the actual capacity
of the adolescent. The emergency exception functions not as presumption that
adolescents may consent in times of emergency but as a presumption of parental
consent.
The emancipated minor statutes provide greater help. Once a minor is
deemed emancipated, he or she obtains nearly all the rights and responsibilities as
an adult. Circumstances that define an emancipated minor vary from state to state,
but most states grant majority rights and obligations if the minor joins the military,
marries, lives away from his or her parents and is self-supporting, or becomes a
parent."2 The last condition that allows emancipation of a minor through
parenthood is granted in only a few states. Michigan is not one of those states.
Some states also include college students and runaways under the umbrella of the
emancipated minor. 13 A court can also declare a minor emancipated.
The conditions for emancipation in most of these situations are obtained
primarily through free choice. This creates a seeming end-run opportunity in
which minors, who could not previously consent to their own medical treatment,
may do so by satisfying any of these requirements. The change in circumstances
creates the justification for granting health care decision-making privileges,
without regards to any changes in the adolescent's actual mental capacity to make
these medical decisions.
111. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-133 (2003); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2397(a)(3)
(West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.064(l) (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 129.040 (LexisNexis
2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-222 (2004).
112. COMM. ON PEDIATRIC EMERGENCY MED., AM. ACAD. ON PEDIATRICS, Consent for Emergency
Medical Services for Children and Adolescents, III PEDIATRICS 703, 704 tbl. 1 (2003).
113. Id.
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The right to medical consent based purely upon circumstances would seem to
defy common sense practice. The emancipated minor is not granted full majority
rights and is still bound by other age-restrictive laws (e.g., smoking, drinking,
voting). Many states' laws recognize that adolescents become emancipated for
purposes of pregnancy care and may be held accountable and deemed competent to
consent to medical treatment during the pregnancy, along with the ability to make
medical decisions for the fetus or newborn.' 1 4 Some states permit a minor to
consent to any legal medical services simply by becoming pregnant or professing
to be pregnant. 115 No state law requires parental consent should a minor want to
continue a pregnancy in the face of her parents' belief that pregnancy termination
would serve the best interest of their adolescent.1 16 The situation where a minor
becomes pregnant and suddenly gains a measure of medical autonomy would seem
to defy logic and common sense principles. Should the same minor who only a
month before becoming pregnant required her parents' consent to obtain a throat
swab diagnosing a throat infection suddenly be competent to decide all aspects of
her and her fetus's health care?
Several state courts have helped define the scope of the emancipated minor.
For example, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington defined the bounds of
the emancipated minor doctrine in the case of Smith v. Seibly. 17  The court
recognized that the emancipation of a minor could occur in the absence of a
statute'18 and that "age, intelligence, maturity, training, experience, economic
independence or lack thereof, general conduct as an adult and freedom from the
control of parents [were] all factors to be considered in such a case."'" 9 Such a
definition by the courts also takes into account the mental capacity (maturity) of
the minor in granting emancipation and is a path that seems more reasonable than
one that takes into account only the circumstances of the minor.
114. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.065 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(1) (West
2005); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2504 (2), (3) (McKinney 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§
2602(A)(1), (3), (4) (West 2004); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2969(E)(2), (G) (2005).
115. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 13, § 710(a) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 577A-2
(LexisNexis 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-402(2)(c) (2005); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10101 (West
2003).
116. COMM. ON ADOLESCENCE, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, The Adolescent's Right to Confidential
Care When Considering Abortion, 97 PEDIATRICS 746, 748 (1996).
117. See 431 P.2d 719, 723 (Wash. 1967). The case involved a man attempting to invalidate his
previous consent to a vasectomy when he was age eighteen. The court noted that although the general
legal age of consent was twenty-one years of age, at the time he consented he was a married eighteen-
year-old with children. Id. at 723.
118. ld.
119. Id.
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3. The Mature Minor Doctrine
Another means of bypassing the general rule wherein minors under eighteen
are unable to consent to their own medical care arises through the mature minor
doctrine. Mature minors are similar in concept to the emancipated minor. They
are adolescents, usually between fourteen and eighteen, who demonstrate a
sufficient level of maturity, but who do not satisfy the criteria for being
emancipated.
Courts have used the mature minor doctrine for several decades. As early as
1926, a Michigan court held that a nineteen-year-old could consent to using a local
anesthetic for tonsil removal. 120 His family sued after he died in the surgery. In
1955, a New York court held that a fourteen-year-old boy could refuse surgery to
correct a cleft palate.' 21 His parents thought that "mental healing" would work
better than surgery. The court found the adolescent to be "mature" and able to
decline the surgery. It did qualify its ruling, however, by adding that "his
condition is not emergent and there is no serious threat to his health or life.' 22
Michelle Oberman has suggested that laws determining the health care of
minors have been formulated to address society's views of adolescent health care
needs. 123  Oberman speculates that "maturity" acts as a euphemistic "code
word.' ' 124  It permits society to grant minors the ability to make independent
medical decisions where it is deemed beneficial.125  However, where society
perceives potentially negative consequences from such decision-making, it denies
the adolescent the distinction of "maturity.' ' 126 Such an arbitrary use of the mature
minor doctrine denies any true right of autonomy such minors may believe they
have. The following cases help to illustrate this point.
Benny Agrelo was a minor who suffered from an enlarged, malfunctioning
liver since birth.2 7 By the time he was fifteen in 1994, he had already undergone
two liver transplants. The first transplant occurred when he was eight and was
rejected after five years when the anti-rejection drug cyclosporin was no longer
effective. He underwent a second transplant and took another anti-rejection drug,
which had side affects of headaches and irritability that prevented him from
120. Bishop v. Shurly, 211 N.W. 75, 78 (Mich. 1926).
121. See In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820, 822-23 (N.Y. 1955).
122. Id. at 822.




127. For a full discussion of Benny Agrelo's situation, see Ann Eileen Driggs, The Mature Minor
Doctrine: Do Adolescents Have the Right to Die?, II HEALTH MATRIX 687, 687-88 (2001); Christine
Gorman, A Sick Boy Says, "Enough," TIME, June 27, 1994, at 65; Oberman, supra note 123, at 129;
Jessica A. Penkower, The Potential Right of Chronically Ill Adolescents to Refuse Life Saving Medical
Treatment-Fatal Misuse of the Mature Minor Doctrine, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1165, 1167-68 (1996).
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leading a normal life. Benny on his own began to decrease his dosage of the drug
until, against the wishes of his mother and doctor, he stopped taking the drug
completely. When his doctors discovered this, the hospital filed a petition under
Florida's child neglect statute where social workers removed him from his home
and placed him in the hospital. There, Benny continued to refuse his medication.
Florida law stipulated that a minor had no right to refuse life-saving medication.
At the hearing though, Benny was found to be of sufficient maturity to make his
own decision to not take his medication and was granted the right to return home
where he died a few months later. 2 8 Benny's case was one of the first that
established a minor's right to refuse treatment on his or her own behalf.129 One
important fact to note with Benny is that, in the end, his family supported his
decision to discontinue treatment.'
30
Another interesting case is that of sixteen-year-old Billy Best. 131 He was
diagnosed with Hodgkin's lymphoma, a type of cancer with a high success rate of
cure. Billy underwent two-and-a-half months of chemotherapy before he began to
refuse treatments. He complained of the painful chemotherapy and believed he
couldn't face four more months of the treatments despite his doctors giving him an
80% chance of recovery should he complete the treatments. Near the end of 1994,
Billy ran away from his parents' Massachusetts home. It was not until a month
later that he returned. He did this only because his parents in a television interview
promised that if he returned home they would not force him to continue his
treatments. Ironically, had Billy stayed away another few months and
demonstrated that he supported himself, in many states the courts may have
declared him an emancipated minor, thereby granting him the ability to refuse care
on his own. The twist in this case is that Billy's lymphoma went into remission
following alternative treatments.'
32
Cases like Billy's push the limits of the mature minor doctrine in granting
minors the right to their own medical treatment. We are left pondering the
question of whether minors like Billy should ever be designated as mature minors
and allowed to decide their own medical treatment, or should we intervene in such
instances where we realize they have made unwise decisions, even in cases where
their parents agree with their decision. If only such cases were so easily
determined as in situations where a child refuses to eat his or her vegetables and
the parents are left with the unenviable task of forcing that child to eat the peas and
128. One can only speculate on how this case may have evolved today in light of another prominent
end-of-life case in Florida, that of Terri Schiavo, eleven years later.
129. Driggs, supra note 127, at 687-88 (citing Nancy San Martin, Defiant Transplant Patient Dies
at Home, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Aug.21, 1994, at I A).
130. Oberman, supra note 123, at 129.
131. Driggs, supra note 127, at 688.
132. Chrstopher B. Daly, Teenage Cancer Patient Seeks to Return to Normalcy--Chemotherapy
Will Not be Part of Treatment, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1994, at A3.
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carrots. If the child does enough kicking and screaming, as in the case of Billy,
many parents would opt to excuse that child from that task. In matters of life and
death with the health of a child, such decisions ought not to be handled so simply.
We come back to Oberman, who believes that the mature minor doctrine was
adopted not in the belief that adolescents are mature enough to make their own
medical decisions, but out of society's desire to avoid negative consequences that
may flow from a minor's "bad" choice.
133
In 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a blanket state law requiring
pregnant minors to obtain parental consent for an abortion was unconstitutional.134
In Bellotti v. Baird, the plaintiff challenged a Massachusetts law regulating minors'
access to abortions. The Court held that if the state requires minors to obtain
parental consent, it must also provide for an alternative procedure for
authorization. 35 Any alternative procedure must allow the minor "to show either:
(1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion
decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents' wishes;
or (2) that even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired
abortion would be in her best interests."' 136 The Court seems to accept the
underlying rationale of the mature minor doctrine, though it provides little
guidance on how a lower court should determine whether or not a minor was
sufficiently mature. It only says that this determination should be on a case-by-
case basis. 1
37
The mature minor doctrine has much to recommend it. In theory, at least, it
permits a sufficiently mature minor to make decisions on his or her own. This is
theoretically consistent with what we as a society accept as a fundamental pillar in
health care policy: autonomy of the individual. Competent individuals have the
absolute right to consent to or refuse health care services. 38 The difficulty faced
by minor adolescents is that they are presumed to be incompetent. The mature
minor doctrine gives such individuals the opportunity to rebut that presumption.
Again, this is entirely consistent with our notions of individuality and autonomy.
The problem with the mature minor doctrine is in how it is applied. Courts have
spent precious little time trying to define actually what it is to be "mature." There
is no good test to determine whether or not an individual minor adolescent has
sufficiently rebutted the presumption.
133. See Oberman, supra note 123, at 131 (arguing that the doctrine is limited to the extent that lack
of agreement on a course of treatment will default to a denial of minor access to decision-making).
134. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 643-44.
137. Id. at 644 n.23.
138. Melinda T. Derish & Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Mature Minors Should Have the Right to
Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 109, 112, 121 n.38 (2000).
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In cases where courts employ the mature minor doctrine, the court generally
looks to the adolescent's situation and the decision he or she wants to make. The
court then determines whether the decision is a good one or not.' 39 If the decision
is "appropriate," the court deems the minor "mature." It follows that where the
court determines the decision "inappropriate," it will deem the minor immature.
This is a fundamentally flawed approach. The "correctness" of a decision should
not be the overriding determinative factor.
Arguably, competent adults make "bad" decisions every day. Competent
adults make decisions they later regret on a regular basis. The ability to make a
"correct" decision certainly is one indicator of competency, but it ought not be the
sole deciding factor. If it were, we would all be in serious trouble. Adolescents
should be allowed to make "bad" choices. This is not only a normal state of adult
being; it is an important developmental learning device. 140 The mark of maturity
should not rest solely upon the final decision. It should include the process by
which the individual reaches that decision. Is he capable of adequately assessing
the cost, benefits, risks, and consequences of whatever decision he reaches? Is she
capable of recognizing and considering the variety of options available to her? If
yes, the minor may be adjudged mature and allowed to make decisions. If no, then
she is immature and should not be allowed to make decisions independently.
We will see below from the scientific literature that the adolescent brain
continues to develop well into the early twenties. 141 It is the unusual minor
adolescent that is fully mature. This should not be construed to mean that
adolescents are incapable of any decision-making abilities. They merely lack
certain decision-making tools, and so they are less capable of independently
assessing risk and long-term consequences. We need to differentiate the types of
decisions that carry significant risk or have potentially significant long-term
consequences. Those that do not should be open to adolescents; those that do may
require more to rebut the presumption of incompetence.
Maturity, however, is a complex phenomenon. Certain aspects of maturity do
occur relatively early in adolescents. Abstract thinking develops around
puberty.142  Other aspects, such as long-term consequence analysis and risk
assessment, appear to develop much later. 143 This makes it potentially impossible
for a court to say "this adolescent is fully mature." Most of the time, a given
139. See, e.g., Oberman, supra note 123, at 129 (reasonably inferring that the judge in Benny
Agrelo's case applied the mature minor doctrine).
140. See Paula G. Williams et al., Adolescent Health Psychology, 70 J. HEALTH CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 828 (2002).
141. See infra Section III (providing an overview of studies indicating continues brain developed
into the twenties).
142. See JEAN PIAGET, THE ESSENTIAL PIAGET 434-44 (Howard E. Gruber & J.Jacques Von~che
eds., 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
143. See infra Section III.
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adolescent is mature with respect to some aspects of development and immature
with respect to others. Trying to find a bright line rule is a difficult task when the
gray zone of maturity development is so wide.
4. Adolescents and the Death Penalty
The U. S. Supreme Court recently decided the case of Roper v. Simmons.
144
The case, which dealt with constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty, turned
largely on the question of adolescent autonomy and cognitive development. In this
case, the American Medical Association (AMA), the American Psychiatric
Association (APA), the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry (ASAP), and
others filed amicus briefs asking the Court to consider the scientific and social
research, which indicated immature brain development and lowered inhibition in
adolescents. 145
In their amicus brief, the AMA, APA, and ASAP argued against the juvenile
death penalty on the basis of research evidence that indicated diminished mental
capacity in adolescents in general and even more so in juvenile offenders:
The adolescent's mind works differently from ours. Parents know it.
This Court has said it. Legislatures have presumed it for decades or
more. And now, new scientific evidence sheds light on the differences.
Scientists have documented the differences along several dimensions.
Adolescents as a group, even at the age of 16 or 17, are more impulsive
than adults. They underestimate risks and overvalue short-term benefits.
They are more susceptible to stress, more emotionally volatile, and less
capable of controlling their emotions than adults. In short, the average
adolescent cannot be expected to act with the same control or foresight
as a mature adult.'
46
The research presented in the brief supports the contention that "regions of
the adolescent brain do not reach a fully mature state until after the age of 18.
These regions are precisely those associated with impulse control, regulation of
emotions, risk assessment, and moral reasoning. Critical developmental changes in
these regions occur only after late adolescence.' 47
Until Roper, the United States had been the only industrialized nation that
practiced capital punishment against juveniles. The prior convictions of juveniles
as adults suggest that a large portion of the American population believed that
juveniles possess the same capacity and sufficient cognitive development to be
tried as adults. The majority of the world's leading nations would seem to believe
144. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
145. Brief of the Am. Med. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549, at 10, 16.
146. Id. at 2.
147. Id. at 2-3.
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that juveniles are a protected class who have not developed the mental capacity to
realize the consequences of their crimes.148  The majority in Roper based its
opinion in part on the scientific evidence indicating juveniles under the age of
eighteen lack maturity and have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.
149
Such an argument may work against advocating for adolescent consent, but the
gray area of treating this age bracket between childhood and adulthood indicates a
need to develop a policy for medical decisions in this age group.
150
Prior to Roper, the Supreme Court had concluded that minors under sixteen
years of age and mentally retarded persons display similar traits of "disabilities in
areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses,'' which categorically
disqualify them from the death penalty. The Court has concluded that members of
these protected groups "do not act with the level of moral culpability that
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct."' 5 2 Based on this precedent
and rationale, the AMA brief argued strongly that if a categorical disqualification
applies to younger adolescents and the mentally retarded, "the same must be true
of 16- and 17-year-old offenders.' 53
"Relative to individuals at other ages, human adolescents as a group exhibit a
disproportionate amount of reckless behavior, sensation-seeking and risk-
taking."'' 54 The behavior stems not from an inability to tell right from wrong as
argued in the brief, but arises from "deficiencies in the way adolescents think."'
' 55
Within the AMA Roper brief, the authors mention how adolescents focus on the
here and now without consideration of the future effects of their current actions.
15 6
The three cognitive deficiencies noted within adolescents included responsibility,
perspective, and temperance. 157 The differences seen in adolescent versus adult
decision-making in risky behavior represent a question of differences in
148. Brief of European Union & Members of the International Community as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1619203, at
1.
149. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
150. Arguably, Justice O'Connor had the better rationale, at least with respect to medical consent.
She accepted that adolescents, as a class, are less mature, but that this should not provide an across the
board bright line rule against the death penalty's application for some juveniles. See id. at 587-89
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). This view is reinforced by the Supreme Court's decision in Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444-45 (1990), and Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of New England, 126 S. Ct.
961, 966 (Jan. 18, 2006) (see discussion infra).
151. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306, 318 (2002).
152. Id. at 306.
153. Brief of the Am. Med. Ass'n et al., supra note 145, at 4.
154. L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCI.
& BIOBEHAVIORAL. REVS. 417, 421 (2000).
155. See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 84, at 742.
156. Brief of the Am. Med. Ass'n et al., supra note 145, at 6.
157. Id. at 7.
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capabilities and not just priorities.' 58  The study by Elizabeth Cauffman and
Lawrence Steinberg, composed of more than 1,000 adolescents and adults, found
that adolescents do not reliably achieve psychosocial maturity until at least
nineteen years of age.' 59 The absence of long-term views, lack of perspective, and
inability to restrain from aggressive impulses marked this adolescent period. The
remainder of the AMA amicus brief follows along the same line of topics as
presented in the following research of the brain imaging studies using MRI.
5. Parental Notification Statutes
Early this year, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case involving a challenge
to New Hampshire's parental notification statute. 60 The New Hampshire statute
required the health care provider to notify the parent of any adolescent seeking an
abortion at least forty-eight hours prior to performing the procedure. 16 1 The bases
for the challenge to the statute include a lack of a "health of the mother" exception,
limited exceptions for abortions necessary to prevent death, and placement of an
undue burden on the adolescent's ability to access care. (The undue burden
argument rested on a failure of the statute to ensure confidentiality for a minor
seeking judicial bypass. The First Circuit did not reach this issue in its decision.
The court described the provision as being in a "grey area," but having already
determined the law to be unconstitutional based on the other claims, it did not need
to address the undue burden issue.) 62
The statute's exceptions for the prevention of death are limited to
circumstances where there is insufficient time to notify the parent.' 63 This time
window can be very difficult to determine. It would effectively require the
physician to make an effort to notify. How else could she know that there was
insufficient time? Also, the statute does not provide for the situation where an
abortion is the best, but not the only, medical option available for saving the
minor's life. The statute allows the judge to permit an abortion without parental
notification if the judge determines that it is in the minor's best interest or if the
judge finds that the minor is "mature and capable of giving informed consent to the
proposed abortion.'
64
158. See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 84, at 743 (discussing the possibility of inherent
disabilities in adolescents when faced with choices in potentially antisocial situations).
159. See id. at 756 (reporting that the greatest psychosocial development occurs between sixteen
and nineteen, and then stabilizes).
160. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 126 S. Ct. 961 (Jan. 18, 2006).
161. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132:25 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
162. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 65 (1 st Cir. 2004), cert.
granted sub nom. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 125B S. Ct. 2294 (2005)
(No. 04-1144), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 961 (Jan. 18, 2006).
163. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132:26(1)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
164. Id. § 132.26 (I1).
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The First Circuit held that the statute did place constitutionally invalid
restrictions upon the adolescent's ability to obtain an abortion. 165 It further held
that any parental notification statute must include exceptions for the adolescent's
health and a broader definition of what a threat to her life encompassed. 66 In
vacating the decision in Heed,167 the Supreme Court reinforced two legal
principles. First, the Supreme Court made clear that states have the right to require
parental notification in certain circumstances. 168  Second, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its holding in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992), that states may not restrict access to abortions necessary to
preserve the life and health of the mother.
69
The Ayotte case is significant in that the Supreme Court expressly reinforces
its rationale as to why minors' rights may be restricted. The Court said, "States
unquestionably have the right to require parental involvement when a minor
considers terminating her pregnancy, because of their 'strong and legitimate
interest in the welfare of (their) young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience,
and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights
wisely."-" 70 It follows, therefore, that in circumstances where adolescents are not
immature, or inexperienced, or lacking in judgment, their rights ought not to be
infringed. For a great many health care decisions, adolescents do not suffer from a
degree of immaturity, inexperience, or lack of judgment to render their decisions
sufficiently unwise to deprive them of their rights.
6. What Can We Learn from Private Industry?
A look at industry practices gives us some insight into how those with a profit
motive view the decision-making capacities of adolescents. Industry advertising
that targets teenagers takes advantage of the perception that adolescents are less
capable than adults in considering long-term consequences. In a released 1981
165. Heed, 390 F.3d at 62, 64, 65.
166. Id. at 64-65.
167. While vacating the decision in Heed, the Supreme Court agreed with the First Circuit's holding
that the statute had violated constitutional principles. However, the Court believed that invalidating the
entire statute was unnecessary if invalidating only the offending aspects was feasible. The Court
remanded the case to the First Circuit for a determination if a less than total invalidation would satisfy
the constitutional concerns. See Ayotte, 126 S. Ct. at 969.
168. Id. at 966.
169. Id. at 967.
170. Id. at 966 (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444-45 (1990)). Ayotte is seemingly
in contrast with the decision in Roper, which asserts that adolescents are always incompetent.
However, Ayotte appears to reinforce a general principle regarding adolescent status. Roper applies that
principle in the specific circumstance of adolescents' facing capital punishment and finds that teenagers
do, in fact, lack the maturity and judgment necessary to face the death penalty. As noted in footnote
150, 1 believe that Justice O'Connor's dissent is more in keeping with the rationale in Hodgson v.
Minnesota, as quoted in Ayotte.
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document, tobacco industry giant Philip Morris stated, "Today's teenager is
tomorrow's potential regular customer, and the overwhelming majority of smokers
first begin to smoke while in their teens."''71
Many ads target teens to appeal to their desires for independence, popularity,
and fun. One of the tobacco industry's most popular icons was Joe Camel. This
advertising campaign was so popular that among adolescents and even in small
children, Joe Camel was as well known as Mickey Mouse. 172 A look at the 1993
statistics from The Maxwell Consumer Report showed that $43 million was spent
on advertising for Camel that year, the second highest among all cigarette brands,
yet was only fourth in brand preference among adults. 173 However, Camel was the
second in brand preference among adolescents.' 74 It would not be a difficult to
predict where the tobacco industry would stand on the issue of lowering the age of
consent. We know from the tobacco industry and its research that adolescents
have a far greater susceptibility to addictive drugs. Their lowered inhibition and
willingness to experiment with drugs and tobacco make them ideal targets for the
marketing campaigns that solicit them. It is well known that most smokers start,
and have a brand preference, before they reach eighteen years of age. 175  The
tobacco industry knows that once they get teens addicted to smoking, they have a
lifelong customer. 7 6 The same message and targeted audience that the tobacco
industry focuses on is not too far off from that of the alcohol industry.
The automobile insurance industry gives us another insight into industry
recognition of adolescent risk-taking. Everyone who has teenage drivers in the
home (or who remembers when they were first learning to drive) knows that
insurance rates drop dramatically once a driver reaches the age of twenty-five. The
insurance industry, whose livelihood depends upon accurate statistics, clearly
understands that risk behavior is most prevalent among adolescents. Automobile
171. Kathiann M. Kowalski, How Tobacco Ads Target Teens, CURRENT HEALTH 2, Apr./May 2002,
at 6.
172. Paul M. Fischer et al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years: Mickey Mouse
and OldJoe the Camel, 266 JAMA 3145, 3147 fig. l (1991).
173. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Comparison of Advertising to Brand Preference in
Adolescents and Adults, 1993, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/research-data/advcoadv/bmdtbl.htm.
174. Id.
175. See Kowalski, supra note 171, at 6 ("Relatively few people start smoking or switch brands
after age 18."); CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Effect of Ending an Antitobacco Youth
Campaign on Adolescent Susceptibility to Cigarette Smoking - Minnesota, 2002-2003, 53 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 301, 301 (2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/
mm5314.pdf ("The majority of persons who become regular cigarette smokers begin smoking during
adolescence.").
176. See Kowalski, supra note 171, at 8, 9 (noting that tobacco companies attempt to recruit
teenagers to be life-long customers).
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rental companies either will not rent cars to anyone under age twenty-five, or place
added restrictions on those rentals.
177
Statistics from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) show year after year that vehicle crashes are a leading cause of teenage
deaths. 78 Teenagers are also the most likely among all age groups not to wear seat
belts. 179 In 1996, vehicle accidents accounted for one-third of all deaths in those
aged fifteen-twenty. 180 This group makes up only 7% of drivers on the road, yet
account for 14% of all traffic deaths. 181
Industry statistics and practices suggest that it would be imprudent to lower
generally the age of consent any further than has already been done. These
statistics would bear out a presumption that teenagers are immature and incapable
of making decisions without consideration for long-term impacts stemming from
their present course of action.
III. "BRAIN AND BRAIN! WHAT IS BRAIN?" WHAT DOES THE SCIENCE SAY ABOUT
ADOLESCENT MATURITY?
Adolescence represents a time of development that is perhaps the most
turbulent in a child's life. This stage of development, with its dramatic physical
and psychological changes, often creates internal conflicts that make this period
such an emotional roller coaster. In order to craft a policy that recognizes this as
the gradual process that it is, we need to be careful to grant adolescents as much,
but not more, than they are psychologically and physiologically able to accept. We
can, and should, look to science to enhance our understanding of adolescent
development.
177. Avis Rent A Car System generally does not rent to any driver under age twenty-five. Avis,
Policies & Procedures: Age, http://www.avis.com/AvisWeb/JSP/global/en/rentersguide/policies/us/
USAge.jsp (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). In the limited Avis branches that do rent to those under age
twenty-five, surcharges typically are applied. Id.
178. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2000, at 2, available
at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSF2000/2000ovrfacts.pdf (last visited Sept. 21,
2006) (reporting motor vehicle accidents as the leading cause of death for every age between four and
thirty-three in 2000); NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2004, at 2
(reporting motor vehicle accidents as the leading cause of death for every age between three and thirty-
three years in 2004).
179. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., SAFETY BELT USE IN 2003 - DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS 16, tbl.5 (2004), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-
30/NCSA/Rpts/2004/809729.pdf.
180. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., Saving Teenage Lives, Introduction: The Need for
Graduated Driver Licensing 1, http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/newdriver/SaveTeens/sectl.html
(last visited Sept. 2 1, 2006).
181. Id.
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A. The Psychology of the Teen Brain
Much has already been written concerning the psychology of the
adolescent. 182 Jean Piaget, the noted cognitive developmental psychologist, held
the view that the most complex of thought processes, formal operations, developed
during adolescence.' 83  Piaget believed the development of formal operations
occurred rapidly between the ages of twelve and sixteen years and is marked by a
shift from a young child's transition in thought from the real and present world to
the teenage mindset of a future world of possible occurrences. 184 This period
marks thoughts of forecasted events or expectations for tomorrow. The teenager
contemplates about his or her various future paths and roles in life. Such roles can
include choices of following a higher education, marriage, or the prospects of
raising a family. The ability to shift their frame of reference to the future allows
adolescents at this stage to make long-term plans.
185
Piaget's cognitive development theories also mark the period of adolescence
as a time in which there is a shift from concrete operations typical of a ten-year-old
child to the formal operations seen in a fifteen-year-old. 186 Given a problem
involving multiple factors, the ten-year-old child working at the concrete
operational level will alter more than one factor, making it nearly impossible to
deduce a clear conclusion as to which factor made the contribution to the change.
This is in contrast to the fifteen-year-old, who would use a more methodical
approach, varying one factor at a time in order to determine which factor
contributes the most to solving the problem. The methodical approach to problem
solving is one factor differentiating the period of adolescence from childhood.
87
Formal operations separate thought from reality.'8 8  They involve the
consideration of non-real possibilities that can be tested and evaluated for their
potential outcomes and consequences. It is a stage where outcomes can be
predicted in different situations. With the development of formal operations,
adolescents move from inductive reasoning, where a conclusion is reached based
upon previous individual experiences, to hypothetical-deductive reasoning, where
hypotheses are used to deduce a conclusion. This development in thought process
is a hallmark of the transition from childhood to adolescence.' 
89
182. See generally Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249
(1996) (examining research conducted on psychosocial maturity and development in adolescents).





188. Peter Sutherland, The Application of Piagetian and Neo-Piagetian Ideas to Further and
Higher Education, 18 INT'L J. LIFELONG EDUC. 286, 289 (1999).
189. BEE, supra note 183, at 188.
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Merely possessing the tool of formal operations and abstract thought,
however, does not necessarily mean that the adolescent is yet competent to use that
tool well. Other psychological and developmental studies have indicated that
adolescents, though capable of good hypothetical-deductive reasoning, often do not
utilize those skills. In their 2001 study, Bonnie Halpern-Felsher and Elizabeth
Cauffman demonstrated that adolescents were far less likely than adults to consider
risks and long-term consequences when making decisions in a series of
hypothetical scenarios.190 The statistical data on adolescent risk behavior bears out
this research in the real world.'91
Adolescents, it seems, have many of the basic tools for adult-type decision-
making. The remaining question is why they do not utilize those tools in an adult-
like manner. Recent studies of physical brain development may give us an answer.
B. The Adolescent Brain: Site Still Under Construction
As recently as a decade ago, most neuroscientists believed that by twelve
years of age, the brain had already reached its final adult structural maturity. 192 In
terms of sheer mass, the brain attains 90-95% of its adult size by the time a child
reaches six years of age. 193 Even several decades ago, however, neuroscientists
recognized that mass alone did not give the full story. Most lay people are aware
that the brain is divided into gray matter and white matter. The gray matter
primarily consists of the actual brain cells, while white matter consists of the
connections among the cells and other support structures. 1
94
While the total brain mass does not increase significantly after age six, the
gray matter continues to thicken and increase throughout the remainder of
childhood, particularly in the regions responsible for higher order thinking and
reasoning. This thickening peaks roughly at the age of eleven or twelve, shortly
before the onset of puberty. A thinning of the gray matter then follows as the brain
reorganizes itself into its final form.1
95
Essentially two powerful processes occur during brain development. During
the first process, the brain vastly overproduces. Once the overproduction is
complete, the brain begins a process of pruning or culling. Neuroscientists have
long been aware of this two-phase process with respect to the number of brain
cells. Late in gestation, the fetal brain generates massive numbers of brain cells.
This process continues into the first several months after birth. Before the age of
190. Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher & Elizabeth Cauffman, Costs and Benefits ofa Decision: Decision-
Making Competence in Adolescents andAdults, 22 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 257 (2001).
191. See supra notes 41-63 and accompanying text.
192. Claudia Wallis et al., What Makes Teens Tick, TIME, May 10, 2004, at 56.
193. Id.
194. See Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, supra note 41, at 1.
195. Giedd et al., supra note 94, at 861-62.
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two years, however, the explosive proliferation of brain cells completely reverses
course. Over the next few years of life, there is a competitive elimination of brain
cells. In the end, only a minority of cells survive. This process leaves behind a
reorganized brain with more efficient and improved neural pathways. Recognition
of this rapid brain reorganization during the first few years of life has led to a
significant commerce in baby stimulation and education aids.
Until recently, most neuroscientists believed that this dual process of
overgrowth and culling occurred only during the late fetal through toddler aged
period of life. Recent studies at the NIH and at UCLA have discounted that
belief.196 Researchers have utilized longitudinal MRI studies of children, taking
brain scans every two years in the subjects' lives. These studies have
demonstrated that the brain undergoes a second dramatic wave of overproduction,
particularly in the frontal cortex, just prior to puberty. Then throughout
adolescence, the brain prunes back the overgrowth until the final mature adult
emerges in the early twenties.' 97
The second wave of growth and culling operates differently from the first,
however. In the period prior to age three, much of the growth and culling involves
the number of brain cells. The second wave during adolescence involves the
number of connections among brain cells. Brain cells interact with each other
through finger-like cell extensions called dendrites. Adolescent brain development
primarily consists of growth and pruning of the dendritic connections.' 98 Along
with the reorganization of brain cell interconnections, the adolescent brain
significantly increases the myelination of the dendrites as well. The presence of
myelin sheaths indicates mature, efficient connections between cells. Increased
myelin sheaths improve the speed and efficiency of electro-chemical transmission,
much like insulation in electric wiring. MRI studies comparing myelination
between twelve- to sixteen-year old adolescents and twenty-three- to thirty-year
old adults demonstrated a significant increase in the presence of myelin over those
years. 199 Researchers saw the greatest difference in the frontal lobes.200 Other
196. Id. at 861; Sowell et al., supra note 94, at 859, 861.
197. See Giedd et al., supra note 94, at 861-63 (reporting increased gray matter production during
pre-adolescence, followed by a decline in post-adolescence); Sowell et al., supra note 94, at 860
(reporting reduction of gray matter between adolescence and adulthood).
198. See Giedd et al., supra note 94, at 863; Sowell et al., supra note 94, at 860.
199. See Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter Densitv
Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During Postadolescent Brain Maturation,
21 J. NEUROSCI. 8819, 8826 (2001) (discussing the dramatic increase in local gray matter density in the
frontal lobes between adolescence and adulthood, and suggesting that this may indicate increased
myelinization).
200. Id. at 8821 (2001).
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regions of the brain, such as the parietal and temporal lobes, 20 had largely matured
by mid-adolescence.20 2
In addition to the frontal cortex, the cerebellum also shows ongoing
development throughout adolescence. Jay Giedd (and others) have discovered that
the cerebellum does not reach maturity until well into the early twenties.
20 3
Neuroscientists once thought that the cerebellum functions primarily to coordinate
motor activity. A well-tuned cerebellum can be associated with an athlete or
dancer. However, recent studies indicate that the cerebellum also provides critical
coordination of cognitive thought as well. 204  It appears that the cerebellum
coordinates both mental as well as physical adeptness. The importance of the
cerebellum lies in its usage to solve more complex problems or situations. Any
skill that requires high thought (such as mathematical, musical, philosophical, and
decision-making) utilizes the cerebellum.20 5
It also appears that cerebellum development is more influenced by
environmental factors than genetic ones. Twin studies have found a weak genetic
link. Brain scans of identical twins showed that their cerebellums were no more
alike than those of non-identical twins.20 6 The significance of this finding should
not be underestimated and has a potentially significant effect on the nature of the
legal response to the question of adolescent consent. Giedd's studies demonstrate
a growth and culling of dendritic connections in the pre-frontal cortex during
adolescence. The important, and not fully answered, question at this point is how
does the brain know which connections to reinforce and which connections to cull.
Certainly in other areas of neurological development the age-old saying of "use it
or lose it" applies.20 7 It stands to reason that similar processes are in place during
the development of the adolescent brain. The skills and activity that an adolescent
decides to take on at this time will form the final mental mold that he or she will
occupy in adult life. This suggests that the law ought to foster a system that
201. The parietal and temporal regions of the brain are primarily responsible for special, sensory,
auditory, and language development. Their maturation in early adolescence may help explain the
timing for various skills development. For example, individuals tend to have difficulty learning foreign
languages after early adolescence.
202. Sowell, supra note 194, at 860.
203. Interview by PBS with Jay Giedd, M.D., Neuroscientist, Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health 5,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/giedd.html (last visited Sept. 21,
2006).
204. Id.
205. Id at 6.
206. Id. at 5.
207. Id. For example, proper development of the visual cortex follows certain critical periods. If
the visual cortex does not receive visual signals during this period, that part of the brain does not
properly develop and the corresponding eye becomes functionally blind. See Nicoletta Berardi et al.,
Critical Periods During Sensory Development, 10 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 138, 138
(2000).
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encourages adolescents to develop their own critical reasoning and risk assessment
skills during this critical phase of brain development.
A study on adolescent brains by the team of Deborah Yurgelun-Todd at
Harvard's McLean Hospital has also revealed the role of the amygdale, contained
within the medial temporal lobe of the brain, in emotional processing in teens.
20 8
The research team utilized functional MRI (fMRI) to uncover differences in
teenage versus adult identification of emotions. The subjects were shown images
of facial expressions and asked to identify the emotion displayed, during which
their brain activities were scanned. The adult subjects were able to identify
correctly the emotion of fear nearly every time, but only half the teens correctly
identified the emotion. Instead, the teens typically responded by saying they saw
shock, confusion, or sadness. The surprising results of the study showed that the
teens that performed poorly on this task had activated the amygdala, a brain region
responsible for fear and other "gut" reactions, rather than the frontal lobe.
Conversely, adults used their frontal lobe, the reasoning part of the brain, in order
to correctly identify the facial feature.20 9
This study showed teenagers relied more on the emotional regions of their
brain. Reactions, versus rational thought, are derived from the amygdala, which
resides deep in the brain. Yurgelun-Todd and other neuroscientists believe that an
immature brain leads to impulsivity, or what some researchers label as risk-taking
behavior. 2'0 The implications of this are enormous for teens where such behavior
is ubiquitous. This reliance on an emotional versus a rational response can often
lead to misjudgments and mistakes in decision-making. These impulsive decisions
characterize the irrational behavior of teens. The teenage brain responds
differently to its external environment than do adult brains. The difference in the
responses between teens and adults to the same visual cues shows the lack of
inhibition to an internal emotional response within teenagers.
2 11
Taken together, the work of Giedd and Yurgelun-Todd demonstrate the
importance of the frontal lobe in adolescent development and decision-making.
The frontal lobe contains the prefrontal cortex, which is associated with numerous
cognitive abilities, including decision-making, risk assessment, and the ability to
judge future consequences. The frontal lobe moderates neural signals from the
amygdala, an indication that both regions are highly linked to one another. An
208. See Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect
Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 195,
198 (1999).
209. See Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, Teenage Brain: A Work in Progress, available at
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/teenbrain.cfm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006), at 2.
210. See Interview by PBS with Deborah Yurgelun-Todd, Director of Neuropsychology and
Cognitive Neuroimaging, McLean Hospital, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/
interviews/todd.html (last visited Sept. 21 2006).
211. See Baird, supra note 208, at 198.
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undeveloped frontal lobe in a teenager holds less control over the amygdala and
has reduced influence over behavior and emotions than a fully developed frontal
lobe of an adult. As the teenage brain progresses into adulthood, the focus of brain
activity gradually relocates to the frontal lobes, and with that transition adolescents
gain a greater ability to make reasoned decisions.
The implications of neural research into adolescent brain development have
potentially far-reaching consequences, as seen in the recent Supreme Court ruling
on the juvenile death sentence, Roper v. Simmons (2005).212 A year before the
Court's ruling barring the death penalty for minors, the American Bar Association
made a statement based upon current neural research urging all state legislatures to
ban the juvenile death penalty because "for social and biological reasons, teens
have increased difficulty making mature decisions and understanding the
consequences of their actions. 2t 3 Melvin Lewis, a child psychiatry and pediatric
expert at Yale University School of Medicine, describes adolescents' emotional
states as "really both part child and part adult. ' ' 214 Adolescence is a process
through which individuals mature from the childlike state into the adult state. The
behaviors associated with this process include self-absorption, mood-swings,
unique dress, and escapism that can include video games, music, talking on the
phone, as well as risky behavior such as drugs or sex.
215
Dr. Ruben Gur, the director of the University of Pennsylvania Medical
Center, states, "The evidence now is strong that the brain does not cease to mature
until the early twenties in those relevant parts that govern impulsivity, judgment,
planning for the future, foresight of consequences, and other characteristics that
make people morally culpable .... "216 Such statements and the research that
supports them would seem to be contradictory to commonly held beliefs that
neural development had mostly peaked or leveled off in early childhood even
before the onset of puberty. As shown by the evidence, this is simply not the case.
Prior to the brain imaging studies by Giedd and his collaborators, the belief
among scientists was that the brain was a finished product by the age of twelve,
the point at which it has reached its full size.217 Coincidentally, this apparently
final stage of physiological development matched with the psychological literature
traced back to Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, who theorized that the highest level
212. 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see discussion supra section II.C.4.
213. Wallis, supra note 192.
214. Adolescence, Brain Development and Legal Culpability, CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT:
THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY (ABA/Juvenile Justice Ctr., Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2004, at 2,
available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/Adolescenee.pdf.
215. Id. at 3.
216. Id.
217. See Shannon Brownlee et al., Inside the Teen Brain, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 9, 1999,
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of cognitive development-formal operations-was attained starting at the age of
twelve.21 8
The significant reorganization of the brain during the adolescent years comes
as no surprise to many adults, especially those with teenagers. Since before the
developmental stage of adolescence was first recognized, all parents have known
that "adolescents as a group exhibit a disproportionate amount of reckless
behavior, sensation seeking and risk taking."2 t9 The contributions these studies
make is a better understanding of why adolescents behave the way they do. Their
behavior stems from "deficiencies in the way adolescents think., 220 The frontal
lobe forms the most complex thinking and reasoning areas of the brain and is the
region that undergoes some of the most important changes in adolescence. The
teenage brain at this stage is undergoing construction and may be incapable of
adult levels of organizational skills or rational decision-making. This helps explain
the poor choices and irrational behavior that characterize the turbulent years of
adolescence.
IV. OTHER RECENT PROPOSALS
While there have been a number of calls to expand adolescent consent
capacity over the past few years, such calls are not new. Adele Hofmann, an early
expert in adolescent medicine, called for a rational approach to adolescent consent
and confidentiality twenty-five years ago.221  There has not been significant
progress in the last quarter century.
In recent years, several scholars have written on the issue of adolescent
capacity in the health care setting. The general inclination has been to expand the
scope of adolescent consent. This general predilection has a strong appeal. Each
of the proposals to date has aspects that I find appealing. However, they fail to
account for much of the recent science concerning adolescent brain development.
Andrew Newman, a physician and lawyer in private practice, makes a strong
argument in favor of reducing the age of medical consent to sixteen years.
222
Newman's proposal has the significant benefit of simplicity. It would free courts
and health care providers from having to determine whether a particular minor has
met the requirements of maturity. Newman supports his position by pointing to
incongruities in the rules of adolescent medical decision-making. He questions
218. Wallis, supra note 192.
219. Spear, supra note 154, at 421.
220. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 84, at 742.
221. Adele D. Hofmann, A Rational Policy Toward Consent and Confidentiality in Adolescent
Health Care, I J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 9, 9 (1980) (proposing an approach based on
"contemporary adolescent cognitive and psychosocial developmental principles").
222. Andrew Newman, Adolescent Consent to Routine Medical and Surgical Treatment, 22 J.
LEGAL MED. 501, 531-32 (2001).
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223how a minor suddenly becomes competent simply by virtue of emancipation.
One must wonder how a pair of seventeen-year-olds, who need their parents'
permission to get married, become infused with decisional competency at the
moment the minister says, "I now pronounce you husband and wife." Newman is
also dubious of the ability of a judge, who has little or no training in medicine or
psychology, to appropriately determine that a fourteen-year-old child is a mature
minor capable of making his or her own medical decisions. 224  We can add to
Newman's list of incongruities by including all the factors that establish
emancipation of a minor. Why should joining the military at seventeen years old,
which requires parental consent, bestow competency on the adolescent? Why
should (in some states) giving birth to a baby at fifteen years of age create
competency that didn't exist the week before delivery?
On first reading, Newman's argument is somewhat compelling. There is little
logical consistency in accepting as competent an adolescent whose parents permit
him to join the military, but denying as competent the similar adolescent whose
parents do not permit him to join the military. 225 Bright-line rules are simple and
easy to enforce. Bright-line rules do have some detractions, however. As
discussed above, whenever one tries to draw a line through a zone of gray, there
will inevitably be a number of false positives and false negatives. 226 Ideally, when
determining where to draw the bright line, one would try to set the line so as to
minimize the number of false positives and false negatives. The problem,
therefore, is how to determine where to draw the line. This difficulty is made all
the more problematic by the wider the gray zone of uncertainty.
Newman argues for reducing the age of consent for routine medical and
surgical treatments. However, his argument concludes with the logical assertion
that "in the absence of any scientific studies showing that a 16-year-old has less
judgment than an 18-year-old (or older), the general consensus on a 16-year-old
having sufficient competency should carry the day., 227 Unfortunately for
Newman's argument, we now have scientific studies that demonstrate that sixteen-
223. See id. at 504-06.
224. See id. at 506-07.
225. One could argue that in this circumstance, we are deferring to the parents' judgment as to the
adolescent's decisional capacity. Parents who believe their child is competent would not stand in the
way of his or her joining the military, while parents who believe that their child is not yet competent
would not give their permission. This argument, however, carries two assumptions of dubious validity.
First, it assumes that parents only assess the adolescent's decisional capacity when they determine
whether to permit their child to join the military. Second, it assumes that parents are actually capable of
making that determination. While the second assumption may actually be true in many, or even most,
circumstances, the first assumption is less likely to be correct.
226. Under a sixteen-year-old rule, false positives would include those adolescents that are deemed
competent at this age who, in fact, had not yet reached true decisional capacity. False negatives would
include the fifteen-year-old who, in fact, had reached true decisional capacity.
227. Newman, supra note 222, at 531.
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year-olds are less competent than eighteen-year-olds. The scientific evidence
further indicates that eighteen-year-olds have less competency than twenty-three-
year-olds. This may argue more for elevating, rather than reducing, the age of
general capacity.
Newman notes that the current law assumes a minor is not competent and
forces the minor to prove maturity. He asks why not assume the reverse and
instead require proof that the minor is incompetent to deny medical consent for that
adolescent. He proposes that the legal age of consent for routine and standard
medical and surgical procedures be lowered to sixteen across all fifty states, with
no further adult consent required. 28 He defines routine medical and surgical
procedures (including all elective surgery except those that are life-threatening and
require immediate surgery), which do not include STDs, abortions, psychiatric
treatment, contraceptive issues, or life-threatening diseases and conditions. 2 9 The
problem with this proposal, besides its simple cutoff of sixteen, is that it excludes
so many procedures for which teenagers would seek medical treatment. Teenagers
who would seek care for STDs and for contraception would likely wish to keep the
knowledge of such medical care from their parents.
Newman points out that the age of eighteen for medical consent has never
been a marker set in stone. He cites the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which lowered
the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen, as evidence of societal flexibility to
notions of adulthood. Many of our age restrictions are set upon an arbitrary basis
such that lowering the age of medical consent to sixteen would not be such a
revolutionary idea.
230
To be fair, however, Newman argues only for lowering the age of
competency to sixteen for routine medical and surgical care (including elective
surgeries). But he does not adequately define what is or is not "routine" care. He
would include in the definition of routine any "medical and surgical procedures
that, by custom, physicians consider generally non-life-threatening. ' ' But would
excluding services related to sexual matters and end-of-life decisions be considered
non-life threatening? 232 His apparent rationale for these carve outs is the
social/political connotations of these services. Such exceptions, of course, create
their own incongruities. Nonetheless, Newman's proposal still carries some
228. Id. at 527.
229. Id. at 508 n.57.
230. Newman asserts that some states, such as South Carolina, Kansas, and Rhode Island, have
already set medical consent at age sixteen. This is correct only up to a point. South Carolina does grant
minors over age sixteen the right to consent for non-surgical health care. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-280
(1996). However, the Kansas statute referenced refers to a pregnant minor seeking pregnancy-related
care. KAN STAT. ANN. § 38-123 (2000). Rhode Island permits minors over sixteen to consent to
"routine emergency medical or surgical care." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.6-1 (1996) (emphasis added).
231. Newman, supra note 222, at 502 n.6.
232. See id at 502 n.6, 528 n.219.
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persuasive force. Given further context, a bright-line sixteen-year-old rule has a
place in a more comprehensive approach to adolescent decision-making capacity.
Elizabeth S. Scott in her 1992 article, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent
Decision-making, raises the issue of bright line rules versus determination of
competency on an individual basis. 233 She understands that case-by-case
determination of the maturity of a minor can be a costly proposition and can be
tainted with the inherent prejudices of the decision-maker. Scott states that
"although bright line rules concededly will result in error in individual cases ... it
is not clear that individualized inquiries will greatly enhance accuracy. 234
Michelle Oberman also discusses bright-line rules in her work, Minor Rights
and Wrongs, which describes their simplicity. 235 She cites research indicating that
minors between the ages of twelve and fourteen "undergo a major shift in cognitive
functioning that enables them to reason abstractly, as well as to consider cause and
effect relationships. 236 The subjective nature of determining the mature minor can
lead to more erroneous decisions than that of the objective bright-line rules.
Oberman also notes the personal bias of the decision-maker in determining
whether the minor's decision meets with the approval of the health care provider or
judge.237 Bright-line rules fail to recognize that the mature minor doctrines and the
emancipated minor statutes were instituted to compensate for the deficiencies in
bright-line chronological rules before these exceptions were adopted. Bright-line
rules still leave far too many "mature, but underage" adolescents, and too many
"immature, but above age" adolescents. Oberman herself states, "[I]ronically, the
flaw with any bright-line standard is its imprecision. In health care, the stakes are
so high that the efficiency-related benefits of chronological markers are far
outweighed by their arbitrary and potentially cruel results."238 Were it as easy to
just give an adolescent a standardized test to determine his or her competency,
there would not even be a need for this discussion.
Elizabeth Cauffman and Lawrence Steinberg, who researched and wrote on
the issue of adolescent decision-making, are not content with guidelines that
emphasize only cognitive aspects in comparing adolescents to adults. 239 Instead,
they advocate maturity of judgment and see differences in decision-making
between adolescents and adults arising from psychosocial, non-cognitive factors
such as responsibility, perspective, and temperance. 240 They stress that there is a
233. Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37 VILL. L. REV.
1607, 1610 (1992).
234. Id at 1668.
235. Oberman, supra note 123, at 132.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 134.
238. Id at 133.
239. See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 84, at 744-45.
240. Id. at 745.
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lack of research proving a link between decision-making and psychosocial
variables. 24' Their research had adults and adolescents complete assessments of
their psychosocial maturity in the three areas previously mentioned. Following
this, the participants were asked questions on hypothetical situations that tested
their decision-making abilities on antisocial or risky behavior. The adolescents
scored much worse on average than the adults, but the adolescents had much
greater variability among scores than the adults. 242 This would support the
argument that some teens possess high decision-making capabilities while others
are on the low end in their decision-making skills.
Another author, Martin Harvey, advocates for a sliding scale of adolescent
competency.2 43 His proposal would give adolescents an increasing ability to refuse
a given treatment depending on the therapeutic benefit of the medical treatment in
244 iquestion. Thus, if a particular therapy had a high potential benefit to the
adolescent, he would not allow the adolescent to refuse the treatment. Conversely,
if the therapy had little potential benefit, he would allow the adolescent to decline
the service. Harvey's proposal has some appeal. However, he focuses his
discussion on the ability of an adolescent to refuse unwanted health care. He does
not fully consider how his proposal would play out when a teenager seeks health
care. More significantly, Harvey's proposal effectively eliminates the adolescent
from the equation. An adolescent's actual capacity to make decisions does not
figure into the analysis. Only the relative therapeutic benefit of the health care
service in question matters. Removing the adolescent from the equation leaves an
unsatisfying result.
Harvey's proposal may seem like an answer that provides a logical solution
to the problem of adolescent consent, but a closer examination reveals that it has
the same limitations as that of the mature minor doctrine. In the mature minor
doctrine, the decision in determining the capacity of a minor is left to the health
care worker and judge and, as previously alluded to by Oberman, such decisions
can be tainted with the prejudices or personal bias of the decision maker without
regard to the actual capacity and maturity of the minor. Harvey's sliding scale
simplifies the process and eliminates the need for intervention by adult decision-
makers, but takes the adolescent entirely out of the process. At least in front of a
judge, the minor can attempt to make a case by proving his or her mental capacity
and maturity, whereas no such avenue of recourse is available to the minor in
Harvey's sliding scale proposal. Harvey's sliding scale concept may have
241. ld
242. See id. at 756-57.
243. Martin T. Harvey, Adolescent Competency and the Refusal of Medical Treatment, 13 HEALTH
MATRIX 297, 298 (2003).
244. Id. at 313.
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produced a favorable outcome in the case of the teen who rejected the treatment for
his highly curable illness. But it can also produce unfavorable results.
In the case of fifteen-year-old Benny Agrelo, who displayed a high level of
maturity and capacity, yet refused to take his immunosuppressant drugs to prevent
organ rejection, the Harvey scale would have taken that decision out of this
adolescent's hands and forced him to continue his treatment even though there was
only a slight chance that he would have survived for more than a few years.
Rhonda Gay Hartman is one author who addresses the issue confronted in the
Benny Agrelo case. In her article Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for
Adolescent Medical Decision-Making,245 Hartman notes that denial of legal
autonomy in making important decisions in life stems from adolescents' lack of
life experiences and exposure to (adversity) obstacles in life that would challenge
and teach them the consequences of their decisions. 246 The presumption here is
that experience is a good teacher and the absence of such life experiences limits the
decision-making ability of adolescents. For most of us, exposure to adversities and
obstacles in life normally make us wiser in our choices and decisions. For some
adults, however, even in some with many years of experience, numerous exposures
to life challenges can still fail to impart wise decision-making abilities.
Hartman also stresses that the lack of studies on the decision-making capacity
of adolescents exacerbates the problem of the absence of policies on adolescent
capacity. 247 It is this absence in understanding adolescent capacity that creates
paradoxes in policies that are obviously contradictions of one another, such as
allowing death sentences for minors who commit murder while disallowing minors
diagnosed with a terminal illness from declining medical treatment to prolong their
existence. In states where legislation exists that control the treatment of medical
care for adolescents in non-emergency cases, such as substance abuse and STDs,
Hartman urges a change in the lengthy legal process where a judge must determine
the maturity of a minor before granting that minor the status of mature or allowing
health care providers legal authority to treat that minor.
Hartman argues against the presumption of incapacity within adolescents
despite the century-old laws that are in place. She states that there is little evidence
to support this position,2 48 but recent research involving brain studies of
adolescents has indicated that adolescent brains are not physically-and thus
cognitively-mature in certain areas until their early twenties.249 Hartman backs
up her stance by referencing cognitive development studies that support the
245. Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming ofAge: Devising Legislation for Adolescent Medical Decision-
Making, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 409 (2002).
246. Id. at 410.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 411.
249. See supra Section III.
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capacity of adolescents in decision-making, which appear at odds with the findings
from the brain imaging studies and research into adolescent decision-making.
She raises the issue of parens patriae in forming the philosophy that governs
legislation which assumes adolescent incapacity. The doctrine of parens patriae
takes a preventative stance in guarding the interests of minors. Hartman believes
that the stance of creating a protective bubble around adolescents hinders the
development of their responsible decision-making abilities. 250 Her position is that
it is to the benefit of society to develop mature adolescents with the capacity to
make decisions independently. The argument of parens patriae can be placed in
an analogy of those adolescents who live constantly under the protective roofs of
their parents' homes even into young adulthood. Many will never fully develop
and mature in both the mental and social sense because those adolescents will
always lack the independent-mindedness that will allow them to think and decide
for themselves the course of action that serves their best interests.
25
'
Hartman calls for scientific research to help inform us in developing policies
involving adolescent medical decision-making. She acknowledges the disparity in
the guiding philosophy between scientific research and legal policy. Science
invites change and reversal of previously held beliefs based upon new findings,
while law stands on a foundation of precedents that discourages reversal of
tradition. She believes each should be a guiding force for the other. With the new
research results from the study of adolescent brains, policies on adolescent medical
consent should also change accordingly.
In her very well-written article, Jennifer Rosato argues in favor of extending
as much decision-making authority to adolescents as they are capable of
handling. 25 2 She wishes to foster adolescent development by providing them the
opportunity to make independent decisions. 253 However, she recognizes that this
must be balanced against the need to protect adolescents from unwise decisions.254
She would differentiate in part based on the sort of medical decision-making
involved. On the whole, her approach of expanding decisional capacity where
possible is appealing, especially for those of us who come into the discussion
250. See Hartman, supra note 245, at 411.
251. The case of Terry Schiavo also comes to mind here. Despite the wishes she expressed before
her condition, that she not be kept on long-term life saving measures, her parents insisted that such
measures be instituted. We only find out after her death through an autopsy that her brain had atrophied
to a state where she could not possibly have been aware of those around her. This is the illusion of the
physical state versus that of the invisible and indeterminable mental state. Only through medical
devices and scans would it be possible to determine the mental state of a patient. Scientific research
and studies can aid us in determining the mental capacity of patients who are incapacitated and unable
to decide by themselves, just as it can also help us understand the mental capacity of adolescents.
252. Jennifer L. Rosato, Let's Get Real: Quilting a Principled Approach to Adolescent
Empowerment in Health Care Decision-Making, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 770-71 (2002).
253. ld. at 791-92.
254. Id. at 794.
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predisposed to encourage adolescent development. However, she does not give
sufficient consideration to the realities of adolescent brain immaturity. Adolescent
brain development places real limits on what teenagers should be allowed to do.
We need to incorporate our understanding of the adolescent brain into our
approach to granting expanded decisional capacity.
V. WALKING THE TIGHTROPE OF ADOLESCENT CONSENT: FINDING THE BALANCE
BETWEEN CHILDHOOD AND ADULTHOOD
As we have just seen, numerous scholars and practitioners have proposed
policies and solutions on the question of adolescent capacity. There lies a general
consensus that adolescents are caught in that intermediate and turbulent state
between childhood and adulthood. This transitional period is often marked by
moments of indiscretion and careless neglect or disregard for the future
consequences of these immediate actions. Such is bome out the expression of the
"wild and carefree" days of youth. As one prominent politician is reported to have
said, "When I was young and irresponsible, I was young and irresponsible. 255
The dilemma of adolescence is that the average teenager on one day acts
more like an adult, on another day acts more like a child, and on that all too often
third day acts like something from outer space. Advocates for the expansion of
adolescents' rights focus primarily on the first day. Opponents of expanding
adolescents' rights focus primarily on the second day. (Advertisers seem to notice
that third day.) Neither side is fully correct or always wrong. We should give
adolescents more rights and responsibilities, but only up to a point.
Adolescents should be granted the independence and autonomy that they are
capable of exercising. At the same time, they need to be protected from their own
improvidence. I propose that adolescents be granted a presumption of capacity for
all routine, low-risk health care procedures that do not involve potential adverse
long-term consequences. For high-risk medical procedures, or procedures with
potentially adverse long-term consequences, adolescents should carry a rebuttable
presumption of no decisional capacity.
The advantage of such a system is obvious. Our understanding of the
adolescent mind has expanded greatly over the past few years. We are in a
position now to align more accurately adolescents' decision-making rights with
adolescents' actual decision-making capabilities. We have seen that adolescents
are capable of rational thought, but they tend to inadequately assess risk and long
term consequences.
255. See BBC News: George W. Bush: Out of His Father's Shadow,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/in-depth/americas/2000/us elections/profiles/576504.stm (last visited Sept.
21,2006).
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The question is not as simple as determining at what age adolescents should
be treated as adults. Adolescents achieve certain adult capacities early in
development. They can engage in reasoned rational abstract thought well before
age sixteen. However, certain other adult capacities, such as good risk assessment,
do not fully develop until well after the current age of majority. As we have seen
above, adolescents do display a relative incapacity to prudent decision-making,
particularly with respect to high-risk situations and long-term consequences.
However, adolescents also display relatively sound cognitive functions in
situations less fraught with risk-taking. Dividing health care procedures along a
matrix of relative risk allows us to give adolescents the capacity to decide those
things they are capable of deciding, while still protecting them from their more
significant improvidence.
The most difficult aspect of this system will be determining what procedures
should be classified as low-risk and which should be classified as high-risk. At the
margins, the question is easy. Nearly everyone would agree that a tetanus shot
falls in the low-risk category. Similarly, nearly everyone would agree that a
complex cosmetic surgery would fall into the high-risk category. But there are
thousands of identifiable health care procedures. Fortunately, the margins are
fairly wide and the gray zone of uncertainty relatively narrow. I would suggest
that the health care professional societies, in conjunction with consumer groups
and state and federal regulators, devise a listing of low-risk procedures. Such a list
should include most diagnostic procedures, blood testing, simple radiography, and
physical examinations. Most common therapies would also be included. The line
gets harder to draw with respect to surgical treatments. It is likely that the majority
of surgical procedures should be left on a high-risk list.
256
With the insight of age and experience, the adults of society often seek to
deny adolescents the right to consent to their own medical treatment, even in
situations that involve routine care and non-life threatening situations. This is due
to a misplaced belief that minors are so wanton in their actions that they are
incapable of making medical decisions that would best serve their interest.
Bright-line rules in which age serves as the sole line of demarcation often
lead to unsatisfactory results. This is especially true in cases of a mature minor
who is capable and fully aware of the consequences of his or her decisions and yet
is still denied access to medical care without receiving prior parental consent. We
have seen studies that demonstrate adolescents' willingness to forego needed
health care in order to avoid parental notification. We have also seen how most
states create statutory exceptions to the default rule in certain circumstances. What
we need is a more comprehensive approach that grants adolescents the ability to
self-consent as much as they are developmentally capable yet protects them from
256. A more detailed listing of what sorts of health care procedures should belong in which
category should be left to health care experts and may be the subject of subsequent articles.
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their predilection towards high-risk behavior and disregard for future
consequences.
As most rational individuals will agree, reaching the age of majority does not
automatically and magically instill capacity into adolescents. All that it grants is
the legal authority to decide any medical treatment they may wish to undertake or
refuse. The day before their eighteenth birthdays, adolescents may not seek care
for a sore throat, obtain a tattoo, have plastic surgery, or get a tetanus shot without
parental consent. On the day of their birthdays they can do any of these things
irrespective of what their parents may say. That these situations are all treated the
same reveals an obvious flaw in the system of adolescent medical consent that we
have in place.
The research bears out the lack of foresight in many of their actions.
Adolescents tend to act more impulsively than adults. However, the research does
not exclude their capacity to determine when they need routine health care.
Adolescents are far more capable than infants or children in medical decision-
making. This does not mean that adolescents should gain full legal medical
consent capacity. This would be imprudent. Many medical decisions carry high
risk and potentially adverse long-term consequences. However, where health care
decisions do not involve high risk or long-term consequences there is little reason
not to grant adolescents the power of consent.
It is often said that success builds upon success and experience is the greatest
teacher. Over-sheltering adolescents from the difficult decisions in life and
persistently making such choices for them inhibits development of their own
decision-making skills. Transitioning from childhood to adulthood is a natural
progression from dependence to independence. Granting them the right to make
their own choices in routine medical care aids in this progression. There is a
legitimate concern that adolescents will, on occasion, make poor choices. Bad
choices are a part of life and a part of learning. Adolescents' making poor choices,
even in low-risk routine care, will be inevitable. Nonetheless, adolescents deserve
the same right to make poor choices as adults have. We need only protect them
from their own inability to assess risk. Where there is little risk, there is little need
for protection.257
257. The abortion issue raises one potentially and politically difficult implication for this proposal.
If the calculus of low risk equals consent capacity holds true, then it follows that any adolescents should
be permitted to consent to any low-risk health care service. Does this, or should this, include abortion?
How low-risk is abortion? An abortion performed early in the first trimester carries less risk to the
adolescent than does carrying a pregnancy to term. Certainly, permitting consent for an abortion allows
an adolescent who is not yet able to deal with long-term risk and responsibility an avenue to avoid those
long-term consequences at a relatively low short-term risk. This would seem to argue in favor of
permitting adolescents to self-consent to abortion. But even under the rubric of this proposal, the
answer is not so simple. Merely distinguishing the relative risk between two potential health care
options does not provide any insight into the actual risks of either option. Should both options carry
moderate or significant risk, neither should be left to the adolescent's sole judgment. The relative risk
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Adolescents should be allowed to make choices in their own routine medical
care. For those of us who fear that they may make the wrong choices, this is
safeguarded largely by the presence of the health care worker whose knowledge
and expertise in such matters will help to guide and advise these adolescents
towards a reasonable and informed decision. As adults we should recognize that
we are often faced with choices in our own medical care, and for most of us, we
depend upon the advice and experience of our medical caretaker to help guide us in
making the most prudent choices for own health care. We should also recognize
that the act of seeking medical care also demonstrates a level of maturity on the
part of the adolescent who understands the nature of his or her condition and
realizes the need for medical assistance. To deny these youths medical treatment
without the consent of their parents in routine medical matters would be a slap in
their faces, pronouncing loudly our lack of confidence in their judgment even if we
are in complete agreement with their decisions.
This proposal does not seek to dismantle the bright-line rules that set the age
of majority. Rather, it seeks to grant legal decision-making abilities in routine
medical care cases to adolescents who have not yet reached that set age limit. It
helps to cover the orphans on the periphery of adolescent medical care who are
physically no longer children but who are often left facing medical situations that
are adult in nature without the rights and confidentiality that are enjoyed and taken
for granted by adults.
A. Other Implications Within Health Care
We should note that while expanding the theoretical and legal capacity of
adolescents to seek health care without the consent or knowledge of their parents
may be a good idea, there are additional health care realities that interfere with
their actual ability to obtain care. Most significant is the financial hurdle
adolescents face. Health care can be very expensive. As a general rule,
adolescents do not have financial independence from their parents. Parents also
tend to be the source of most adolescents' health insurance. Adolescents will not
obtain true health care independence until they also obtain financial access to
health care services. This is a reality that this article does not attempt to address.
It is a necessary future step. However, the lack of financial independence ought
not serve as a bar to age-appropriate independent decision-making.
argument grows in strength with respect to such treatments as Plan B, which is of sufficiently low risk
that many advocates legitimately favor permitting it to be sold over the counter. Plan B carries
considerably less risk than does a more traditional abortion, carrying a pregnancy to term, or the
responsibility of caring for a newborn baby.
[VOL. 9:2:315
2006] ADOLESCENT CONSENT IN HEALTH CARE DECISION-MAKING 363
B. Implications Beyond Health Care
The issues and proposals discussed in this article are primarily intended to
address the realities and needs of adolescents within the health care system. In
doing so, I attempt to outline the boundaries of adolescent consent and capacity.
While I focus on adolescents and the health care system, we must remain cognizant
of the implications beyond health care. The same rationales employed here can
and arguably should be applied equally to all areas of the law, including contract,
tort, and criminal law. If adolescents have obtained competence to make certain
decisions within health care, have they not attained the same in other areas as well?
I have argued that adolescents should be granted the right to consent to health
care services that do not carry high risk or involve potential long-term adverse
consequences. What impact should this have in other areas? When should
adolescents be held to short-term contract obligations? When should adolescents
be liable for the torts they commit? When should adolescents be held liable for the
crimes they commit? These are all valid questions, and they need to be addressed.
The more complete our understanding of the development from child to adult, the
better we will be able to assign rights and responsibilities.
It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that the answer to each of these
questions must necessarily be the same. Yes, the same understanding of
adolescent development should be applied across the board. But that does not
necessarily mean that we will get the same answer in each discipline. Each
discipline must look to its own unique needs and expectations. Each may place
different emphasis on particular aspects of cognitive thought. Each may have
differing policy concerns with which to contend.
Once the various disciplines have worked out their unique underlying
considerations, they should then look to the science of adolescent development.
They can then construct their own matrix of what rights and obligations should be
awarded and imposed upon adolescents of various ages. This article is intended to
answer that question only in the context of health care decision-making. Future
articles may examine this question in other areas.
VI. CONCLUSION
We know that adolescents are not children, and they should not be treated as
such. Yet neither are they adults, and we should not require or expect them to act
as full adults. They are caught in a terrible in-between, neither child, nor adult, but
in transition from one to the other. The path of adolescents is neither simple nor
uniform. All teenagers progress at their own pace and in their own way. Ideally
we could give each adolescent individualized assessments at each decision-making
point. But this is neither realistic nor practical. In order to have some efficiency in
the system we need a certain level of bright-line rules. The ones we have in place
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currently do not accurately reflect the best that we can do with the knowledge that
we now possess. I do not insist that the proposal laid out here is and will remain
the best indefinitely. As our scientific understanding of adolescent development
progresses, we may need to revise again our approach to adolescent decision-
making. Should we develop a simple, easily applied test for adolescent decision-
making capacity, that too will necessitate a revision in our approach. As science
further expands our knowledge, we will revisit this question. And while we ought
not make major modifications with every small advance, a sufficiently critical
mass of information has developed over the past several years to justify an
expansion of adolescent decision-making for low-risk health care procedures and a
restriction on adolescent decision-making for high-risk health care procedures.
